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PROSECUTING IN THE SHADOW OF THE JURY 
Anna Offit 
ABSTRACT—This Article offers an unprecedented empirical window into 
prosecutorial discretion, drawing on research between 2013 and 2017. The 
central finding is that jurors play a vital role in federal prosecutors’ decision-
making, professional identities, and formulations of justice. This is because 
even the remote possibility of lay scrutiny creates an opening for prosecutors 
to make commonsense assessments of (1) the evidence in their cases, (2) the 
character of witnesses, defendants, and victims, and (3) their own moral and 
professional character as public servants. By facilitating explicit 
consideration of the fairness of their cases from a public vantage point, I 
argue that imagined jurors serve as an ethical resource for prosecutors. 
Part I reviews contemporary legal and interdisciplinary research on the 
declining number of jury trials and prosecutorial discretion in the United 
States. Part II describes the ethnographic research method deployed in this 
case study. Part III presents the empirical findings of this study with attention 
to how hypothetical jurors inform prosecutors’ evaluations of their cases, 
evidence, investigations, and plea agreement discussions. Part IV considers 
several explanations for hypothetical jurors’ perceived relevance to 
prosecutors’ work beyond their instrumental and strategic value. Part V 
concludes that the United States Attorney’s Office that is the subject of this 
study models the democratizing potential of lay decision-makers, even in 
hypothetical form. This finding offers a powerful rationale for fortifying the 
United States jury system and brings a novel perspective to the study of 
prosecutorial ethics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the infrequency of jury trials in the United States,1 references 
to jurors pervade federal prosecutors’ work from the earliest stages of their 
case preparation. This includes prosecutors’ discretion to decline cases, 
modify investigations, indict defendants, and encourage guilty pleas. These 
 
 1 See DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 327–35 (2016) (providing 
statistics showing the decline in jury trials from 1962–2013); SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN 
JURY: RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND 
JURIES 25–48 (2016) (describing how the jury’s role has declined in America as compared to its more 
powerful role in the eighteenth century); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the 
Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1257–59 (2005) (including data that shows the steady decline 
in jury trials in both state and federal courts). 
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references are pervasive because the mere possibility that a case will proceed 
to trial prompts attorneys to construct the pursuit of justice around the 
imperative of appealing to the common sense of an imagined public. 
This consideration of hypothetical jurors is underappreciated by 
scholars. Many commentators assume that the decline in the overall number 
of trials necessarily diminishes lay decision-makers’ impact on the legal 
system.2 Without disputing this view, this Article contributes much-needed 
nuance by examining the role that jurors play in the organization of 
prosecutions in the United States and, more specifically, as an ethical 
resource for federal prosecutors. Its point of departure is the decline of the 
American jury trial. Although practitioners and legal scholars have 
bemoaned this fact and its implications for individual defendants,3 there 
remains dispute about the influence of the right to a jury trial on the operation 
of our justice system. 
Emerging from this broader project, this Article is the first to document 
the presence of jurors in federal prosecutors’ decision-making as they assess 
evidence, witnesses, and ongoing investigations with colleagues and 
supervisors. Prosecutors use hypothetical jurors as a strategic resource to 
anticipate potential trial jurors’ reactions to evidence, arguments, and 
theories of the case. Many also rely on hypothetical jurors to present 
impersonal critiques of supervisors’ approaches to cases and evidence. In the 
process of invoking jurors’ perspectives, a number of prosecutors give 
expression to justice considerations that reorient their exercises of discretion. 
They also benefit from the democratizing potential of hypothetical jurors, 
which broaden the knowledge repertoires deemed relevant to their work and 
prompt collaborative decision-making.4 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Following this Introduction, Part I 
offers an overview of the legal scholarship that bears on this study, focusing 
on empirical attention to declining criminal jury trial numbers in the United 
States and the concurrent rise in plea agreement dispositions. Part II 
describes the qualitative research methods deployed in this research. Part III 
presents the Article’s central finding that Assistant United States Attorneys 
 
 2 See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman, Vanishing Trial, Vanishing Community?: The Potential Effect of 
the Vanishing Trial on America’s Social Capital, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 165, 176–77 (linking the rarity of 
jury trials to the perception that the judicial branch of government is elitist and remote from citizen 
participation). 
 3 See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, So What?: Possible Implications of the Vanishing Trial Phenomenon, 
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 973, 974–76 (2004) (speculating about changes in the legal landscape, such 
as the privatization of dispute resolution or a move toward an inquisitorial system, in the event that 
American trials were to disappear). 
 4 See infra Part IV. 
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(AUSAs)5 assess, adjust, and prepare their cases with continual reference to 
hypothetical jurors’ perspectives. This data is analyzed in Part IV with 
attention to factors that contribute to jurors’ salience in prosecutors’ work. 
Finally, Part V provides recommendations for integrating hypothetical jurors 
and potential areas for further study. 
I. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
This inquiry into how federal prosecutors reference hypothetical jurors 
builds on prior empirical and theoretical scholarship exploring the evolution 
of the jury trial and the role of the prosecutor. To appreciate the implications 
of the present study and how it adds nuance to ongoing scholarly discussions, 
it is helpful to consider recent developments in the prevalence of jury trials 
and prosecutorial discretion. 
A. Contributing Factors and Effects of Declining Jury Trial Numbers 
Legal and interdisciplinary scholars have documented a steady decline 
in federal criminal and civil jury trials over the last century.6 In 2010, 97.4% 
of federal criminal cases were resolved by guilty pleas rather than bench or 
jury trials.7 In 2017, 2.15% of federal criminal defendants that went to trial 
had their cases decided by juries.8 Facing a similar, but more precipitous 
decline, 0.76% of federal civil cases were resolved by jury trials in 2015,9 
 
 5 I use the “AUSA” acronym and titles “federal prosecutor” and “prosecutor” interchangeably, in 
conformity with colloquial usage. 
 6 See, e.g., ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 82–88 (2009); Marc Galanter, 
The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460–65 (2004) (focusing on civil litigation). 
 7 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS ONLINE, at tbl.5.22.2010 (2010), https://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JJ9B-7D5S] (showing that the remaining cases that resulted in conviction were resolved 
by jury trial (2.3%) or bench trial (0.29%)). 
 8 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2017, 
at tbl.D-4 (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_d4_0331.2017.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/84AM-LP77] (showing that, out of 75,344 total reported federal criminal cases that reached 
trial in 2017 (resulting in a conviction or an acquittal), 1618 were tried by juries). 
 9 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2015, at tbl.4.10 (2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/table4.10_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP2U-MJAH] (showing 
that, out of 274,362 total reported federal civil cases that were terminated in fiscal year 2015 (with the 
exception of land condemnation cases), 2091 were tried by juries). 
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falling to 0.65% in 2017,10 and 0.60% in 2018.11 The jury trial rate for civil 
cases has remained below 1% since 2005.12 Mirroring this trend, the number 
of citizens summoned to serve as federal jurors between 2006 and 2016 
declined by 37%.13 
State criminal and civil jury trials have followed a similar trajectory. 
Based on a 2009 stratified sample of forty of the largest seventy-five counties 
in the country, data collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) shows 
that 2% of felony convictions result from trials,14 with the rest obtained 
through guilty pleas.15 Corroborating this finding, a survey of state criminal 
and civil dispositions in fifteen and sixteen jurisdictions, respectively, 
reported that 1.1% of criminal cases and 0.5% of civil cases were resolved 
by jury trials in 2009.16 
In light of the downward trend these statistics reveal, researchers have 
sought explanations for the decline in jury trials. In so doing, they have 
paired empirical studies with claims about the implications of diminished lay 
participation in the legal system in both the civil and criminal contexts. In 
the Sections that follow, I will examine each facet of the legal system in turn. 
 
 10 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2017, at tbl.C-4 
(2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_c4_0331.2017.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ZM9F-Q7QF] (showing that, out of the 286,738 total reported federal civil cases that were 
terminated during the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2017 (with the exception of land 
condemnation cases), 1878 were tried by juries). 
 11 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE C-4—U.S. DISTRICT COURT—CIVIL FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (MARCH 31, 2018), at tbl.C-4 (2018),  https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
statistics/table/c-4/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2018/03/31 [https://perma.cc/F496-UK4C] 
(showing that, out of the 286,585 total reported federal civil cases that were terminated during the twelve-
month period ending March 31, 2018 (with the exception of land condemnation cases), 1706 were tried 
by juries). 
 12 MARC GALANTER & ANGELA FROZENA, POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INST., THE CONTINUING DECLINE 
OF CIVIL TRIALS IN AMERICAN COURTS 3–4 (2011), http://www.poundinstitute.org/ 
sites/default/files/docs/2011%20judges%20forum/2011%20Forum%20Galanter-Frozena%20Paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E26Z-CY7R]. 
 13 John Gramlich, Jury Duty Is Rare, but Most Americans See It as Part of Good Citizenship, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/24/jury-duty-is-rare-
but-most-americans-see-it-as-part-of-good-citizenship [https://perma.cc/Y3US-ZUJ7] (noting that in 
2006, 307,204 citizens were summoned for jury service—a figure that declined to 194,211 citizens 
summoned in 2016). 
 14 BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 - STATISTICAL TABLES, at tbl.21 (Dec. 2013), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf [https://perma.cc/96VU-Q2XJ]. 
 15 See id. 
 16 VICTOR E. FLANGO & THOMAS M. CLARKE, REIMAGINING COURTS: A DESIGN FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 68 tbl.4A1, 69 tbl.4A2 (2015) (capturing the declining percentage of case dispositions 
by bench and jury trial between 1976 and 2009). 
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1. The Decline of the Jury Trial in Civil Litigation 
Scholars have attributed the trend away from civil jury trials to the 
expansion of pretrial procedure, growing and changing caseloads, pleading 
reform, and the proliferation of private alternatives to public dispute 
resolution.17 In response to claims that pleading requirements fail to satisfy 
their notice-and-disclosure function for civil litigants, the drafters of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implemented a series of pretrial discovery 
techniques that effectively replaced trials.18 Derived from English nonjury 
equity courts, these discovery procedures allow parties to compel the 
production of paper (and now, electronic) documents19 and require another 
party, under oath, to answer oral questions20 and respond to written 
questions.21 
The scope of discovery was expanded in 1946 when Rule 26 was 
amended to encompass material “reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence” and again in 1970 to include “relevant” 
material, defined broadly in the Supreme Court’s decision in Oppenheimer 
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders.22 In response to critics of liberal discovery rules and 
growing dockets, amendments in the 1970s and 1980s increased judges’ 
managerial power, allowing the court to limit discovery requests deemed 
burdensome or wasteful of parties’ resources.23 This included a revision of 
Rule 16 that made “facilitating settlement” an explicit aim of pretrial 
conferences.24 In practice, the discovery rules thus did more to prepare 
parties for settlement than for trial by laying out the strengths and 
weaknesses of cases to the parties involved.25 
 
 17 See, e.g., HALE, supra note 1, at 335–41. 
 18 John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 542–
45 (2012). Reference to “discovery” encompasses the methods parties use to obtain evidence from one 
another—including requests for the production of documents, answers to interrogatories, etc.—under the 
rules of civil procedure. 
 19 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 20 Id. 30(a)(1). 
 21 Id. 33(b)(3). 
 22 Id. 26(b)(1); Oppenheimer Fund Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (“The key phrase in this 
definition—‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action’—has been construed broadly 
to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, 
any issue that is or may be in the case.” (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 503 (1947))). 
 23 SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SLAMMING THE FEDERAL 
COURTHOUSE DOORS? 33 (2013). Those who study “managerial judging” have underscored judges’ 
unreviewable discretion to resolve cases with an eye toward efficiency rather than the benefits of public 
adjudication. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges: The Potential Costs, 45 PUB. ADM. REV. 686, 
688–89 (1985). 
 24 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5). 
 25 Langbein, supra note 18, at 547–48. 
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Declining trial numbers have also been attributed to the growth in civil 
case filings and shifting judicial caseload during the twentieth century. This 
has included, for example, the rise of employment discrimination and other 
civil rights cases, which are more likely to be resolved by summary judgment 
than the tort and contract cases they replaced.26 Furthermore, the increasing 
complexity of and preparation time required by civil litigation often lead 
parties to rely on extensive discovery rather than long-postponed trials to 
glean facts from the various institutional litigants who may be involved in 
cases.27 In federal court, others have noted that growing criminal caseloads 
and the Speedy Trial Act’s call for the prompt resolution of such cases create 
additional pressure to dispose of civil matters before trial.28  
The heightened pleading standard after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal may also reduce the number of civil jury and bench 
trials.29 In the wake of these decisions, legal scholars have posited that the 
Court’s higher “plausibility standard” for relief will lead to the dismissal of 
weak cases that would benefit from discovery and proceed to trial.30 Some 
have demonstrated this claim empirically, focusing on Iqbal’s adverse 
effects on particular litigants (i.e., individuals as opposed to government and 
corporate actors)31 and impact on civil rights cases.32 Though the 
 
 26 HALE, supra note 1, at 336–37. 
 27 Langbein, supra note 18, at 571. 
 28 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 
543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 48–51 (1996). The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, which was 
amended in 1979, provides that a trial must begin within seventy days from the date an indictment or 
information is filed, or a defendant against whom a charge is pending appears before an officer of the 
court. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). 
 29 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that the parallel conduct of 
telecommunications companies—which did not compete with one another in particular markets—without 
evidence of an agreement, was insufficient to state a claim of conspiracy under the Sherman Antitrust 
Act); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (dismissing a complaint for purposeful and unlawful 
discrimination on the grounds that it did not demonstrate that the petitioners adopted and implemented a 
post-9/11 detention policy for the purpose of discriminating based on race, religion, or national origin). 
 30 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 870–71 (2010) (writing, with respect to Iqbal, that the Court 
dismisses “not only clearly meritless suits, but also suits that might merely be described as weak but that 
are not meritless (i.e., suits with too low a probability of trial success). An example is a negligence case 
in which the defendant’s conduct is within the range that a jury could properly deem unreasonable . . .”); 
Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 
838 (2010) (“The new procedural regime would exchange our current false positives for an unknown 
number of false negatives.”). 
 31 See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 
2122 (2015) (noting that between 2006 and 2010 individual plaintiffs were more likely to have their cases 
dismissed than governmental and corporate plaintiffs). 
 32 See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in 
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 241 (2011–2012) (noting that 
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Administrative Office of the United States Courts identifies cases that are 
terminated before trial, it does not provide additional information that would 
indicate how many of these cases settle.33 Further empirical research is thus 
required to differentiate cases that are dismissed, resolved by summary 
judgment or judgments on default, or resolved through other private 
agreements in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal.34 
Finally, scholars have also observed the plethora of evolving dispute 
resolution techniques that have replaced trials.35 This includes bureaucratic 
organizations’ internalization of adjudication processes36 and “alternative 
dispute resolution” (ADR)—defined broadly as the use of a third-party 
neutral decision-maker outside the courtroom.37 In some cases, disputants 
agree to ADR through contractual agreements including, for example, those 
related to motor insurance, employment, construction, and agreements 
typical of the healthcare and banking industries.38 Regardless of the source 
of the agreement, ADR removes disputes from the civil trial context and 
away from the jury. 
Scholars have highlighted the implications of the dramatic fall in the 
number of civil jury trials for ordinary litigants’ access to courtrooms for 
private disputes and the growing privatization of a historically democratic 
facet of the U.S. justice system.39 Though the civil context presents 
 
“motions to dismiss challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings are much more common since Iqbal, and 
far more cases are being dismissed after the release of that decision than before”). 
 33 See Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data and Inference 
in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 571, 580–81 (2004). 
 34 See id. at 571. 
 35 See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445, 473 
(Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (challenging neat distinctions between “public” and 
“private” approaches to dispute resolution). 
 36 See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations 
on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 941, 942–43 (1999) (describing 
four ways that legal rulemaking has been internalized, including through the increased (1) “legalization” 
of firms, (2) use of ADR within and between organizations, (3) power of in-house counsel, and (4) 
internalization of “legal enforcement” through private security personnel). 
 37 See Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moller & Laura Petersen, Escaping the Courthouse: Private Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in Los Angeles, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 277, 278 (1996). 
 38 See id. Stewart Macaulay has also characterized the use of internal dispute resolution procedures 
in corporate contexts as part of a parallel criminal justice system. See Macaulay, supra note 35, at 450–
51. Though corporations may avoid the reputational damage associated with public legal proceedings, 
the wrongly (or rightly) accused may also face more relaxed evidentiary restrictions than they would see 
in court. See id. Likewise, critics of mandatory arbitration clauses that appear in contracts lament the fact 
that many consumers not only unwittingly sign away their right to a day in court but also forfeit their 
right to participate in class action suits. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets 
the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2000). 
 39 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from the 
Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1553–55 (2016) (arguing that class action bans in standard contracts 
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distinctive equity and privatization issues, it shares in common with criminal 
trial scholarship critical attention to the decreased presence of lay decision-
makers. 
2. The Decline of the Jury Trial in Criminal Prosecution 
In the criminal context, the most recent available data from a sampling 
of the seventy-five largest counties revealed that in 2009, only 2% of 
defendants with felony convictions were tried by juries.40 In 2014,41 1730 
defendants were convicted by juries, whereas 76,163 pleaded guilty.42 In 
federal court this figure is similar; in 2018, juries rendered verdicts in 1.88% 
of cases.43 The historical emergence and pervasiveness of plea agreements 
as a means of dispute resolution has been attributed to shifting sentencing 
regimes in the United States, affecting parties’ incentives to secure swift and 
certain conviction over unpredictable jury verdicts.44 Proponents of plea 
agreements point to their practical necessity in light of courts’ limited 
resources and significant caseloads.45 For some, plea agreements are 
 
have had the effect of keeping poor litigants off the federal docket); see also Richard C. Reuben, 
Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 309 
(2004) (noting that mandatory arbitration, for example, undermines the goal of democratic governance to 
imbue citizens with decision-making autonomy). 
 40 REAVES, supra note 14, at 24 tbl.21. For misdemeanor convictions this figure is so low that the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics does not report a percentage. Id. 
 41 This is the most recent year for which the Bureau of Justice Statistics has federal data. 
 42 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING 
STATISTICS (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc [https://perma.cc/Y3PA-3E8Q] [hereinafter 2014 FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CASE STATISTICS]. 
 43 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE D-4—U.S. DISTRICT COURT—CRIMINAL FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (MARCH 31, 2018), at tbl.D-4 (2018), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-4/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2018/03/31 [https:// 
perma.cc/6B2U-LQ97] (showing that, out of the 76,432 total reported federal criminal defendants whose 
cases were disposed of during a twelve-month period ending March 31, 2018, 1436 were tried by juries). 
 44 See, e.g., LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH 
SUMMARY 2 (2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R5LK-R2D4] (noting that judicial sentencing constraints and the risk associated with 
unpredictable jury verdicts prompts defendants to plead guilty and contributes to prosecutors’ discretion). 
 45 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (Chief Justice Burger arguing that “[i]f 
every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would 
need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities”); George Fisher, Plea 
Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1038 (2000) (noting that plea bargaining’s efficiency made it 
appealing to prosecutors in the mid-nineteenth century); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 21 (1978) (lamenting Supreme Court opinions of the 1970s that presented plea 
bargaining as an expedient alternative to honoring historical values undergirding the American 
adversarial legal system, including the central role of lay participation therein); Laurie L. Levenson, 
Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process: Missouri v. Frye & Lafler v. Cooper, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
457, 469–70 (2013) (outlining perceived advantages of plea bargains including their speed and 
efficiency). 
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believed to offer an expedient and equitable alternative to trials.46 Others 
claim that guilty pleas can disparately punish similarly situated defendants 
by pointing to idiosyncrasies between verdicts rendered by jurors and 
sentences imposed by judges.47 
To this end, some proponents of plea agreements have analogized them 
to the bargaining process that precedes civil settlement negotiations, which 
similarly take place in the “shadow” of a potential trial.48 According to this 
logic, plea agreements reflect the prosecutor’s interest in maximizing the 
deterrent effects of a punishment while conserving resources, and the 
defendant’s interest in minimizing his or her sentence. Taking this 
bargaining model as a point of departure, some critics highlight obstacles to 
the creation of efficient and voluntary agreements, including the contention 
that prosecutors’ superior knowledge about the strength of cases results in 
asymmetrical relationships vis-à-vis defendants, which can cause defendants 
to imprudently waive their right to a jury trial.49 
Interdisciplinary legal scholars are increasingly devoting attention to 
prosecutors’ discretion to prosecute (or decline to prosecute) cases, which, 
as the empirical portion of the Article shows, is a significant but largely 
 
 46 See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 1 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 737 (2009) (outlining a defendant’s choice to enter into a plea bargain and the positives 
and negatives associated with that alternative); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s 
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004) (describing how plea bargains in criminal cases 
are like settlements in civil cases in that they exist outside of the shadow of the norm). 
 47 See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 46, at 738–39 (arguing that prosecutors’ plea 
bargaining practices hinder coordinated responsive action on the part of defendants that would undermine 
this technique, given that prosecutors do not have the resources to try all defendants in court); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEG. STUD. 289, 303 (1983) (“Inequality thus 
is built into the system at the outset. At subsequent stages, the government may select procedural rules 
that permit mistaken decisions and thus treat identical cases differently.”). 
 48 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 
2467–68 (2004) (critiquing the prevalence of the “shadows of trials” approach to plea bargaining for 
failing to consider numerous “legally irrelevant factors” that can result in skewed or inequitably allocated 
punishment). 
 49 See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1083, 1101 (2015) 
(arguing that contemporary plea bargaining practice affords the defendant “no substantive right against 
overwhelming force” by a prosecutor who can legally exercise charging discretion); Jennifer F. 
Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 713 (1988) 
(explaining the asymmetry between the bargaining positions of the prosecutor and defendant due to the 
prosecutor’s superior knowledge and the “time and investigative resources available” to her); see also 
Yue Ma, Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining in the United States, France, Germany, and Italy: 
A Comparative Perspective, 12 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 22, 25–26 (2002) (commenting that critics of plea 
bargaining have highlighted prosecutors’ “unilateral determination of the level of defendants’ criminal 
culpability”—undermining plea bargaining’s theoretically equitable “give-and-take” character); Stuntz, 
supra note 46, at 2569 (highlighting the added obstacle to efficient bargaining inherent to the opacity of 
the plea bargaining process). 
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opaque barrier to trial.50 The pressures of public election for both judges and 
prosecutors may also take an unpredictable toll on attitudes toward jury 
trials; in the criminal context, guilty pleas may promise insulation from 
public scrutiny of politically controversial disputes.51 Literature on criminal 
and civil case terminations in advance of trial thus emphasizes the benefits 
of public dispute resolution for litigants and lay decision-makers alike.52 
In both the civil and criminal context, jury trials are rare and statistically 
in decline. But to understand the function juries continue to play in the 
organization of prosecutions, it is important to consider another contributing 
factor: prosecutorial discretion. 
B. Dimensions and Effects of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Federal prosecutors exercise broad discretion in their work.53 Their jobs 
entail negotiating the meaning and limits of federal laws that range from 
prohibitions on organized crime, gang violence, and terrorism to the 
prosecution of politicians who accept bribes. They can contribute to 
decisions on how to investigate cases,54 what charges to bring,55 and how to 
 
 50 See, e.g., JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW 
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 134–36 (2017) (noting the dearth of empirical data on prosecutorial decision-
making: “Despite the power of prosecutors, there is almost no data or research on what drives them”); 
Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and the Limits 
of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 390 (2008) (characterizing the prosecutor’s discretion not to 
prosecute as contributing to the “lawless potential of prosecutorial discretion,” which confers a “sovereign 
prerogative” on such an official). 
 51 See John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 261, 270 (1979) (“Not only was the nontrial solution of plea bargaining more rapid than bench trial, 
it also protected the weak, elective American trial bench from the moral responsibility for adjudication 
and from the political liability of unpopular decisions.”); Bruce P. Smith, Plea Bargaining and the Eclipse 
of the Jury, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 131, 135 (2005) (noting a theory of plea bargaining’s increasing 
prevalence that links the practice to public elections for prosecutors in the mid-nineteenth century). 
 52 See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 39, at 1537 (explaining how the unavailability of class action litigation 
is disproportionately more harmful to low-income groups); see also HALE, supra note 1, at 405–07 
(outlining the value of jury service for participating jurors as well as the criminal justice system more 
broadly). 
 53 See Candace McCoy, Prosecution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
663, 673 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (describing prosecutors’ wide charging discretion as well as offices’ 
(and individuals’) highly variable criteria for declining to prosecute cases depending on local legal 
culture); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 228–29 
(1969) (“The American assumption that prosecutors’ discretion should not be judicially reviewable 
developed when executive functions were generally unreviewable. The assumption is in need of 
reexamination in the light of the twentieth-century discovery that courts can review executive action to 
protect against abuses while at the same time avoiding judicial assumption of the executive power.”). 
 54 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201–02 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(asserting prosecutors’ discretion to make investigative decisions). 
 55 See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (noting that the decision of “what charge 
to file or bring before a grand jury” is one that typically rests “in the prosecutor’s discretion”). Prosecutors 
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approach plea negotiations.56 Importantly, in the criminal context, they 
decide when to dismiss complaints and indictments57 or request downward 
departures from the Sentencing Guidelines in exchange for defendants’ 
assistance.58 
In practice, the factors that contribute to prosecutorial decision-making 
are complex, variable, and under-studied. With the exceptions of quantitative 
research related to filing decisions and trial dispositions59 and of insights of 
prosecutors who choose to publicize their firsthand experience,60 limited 
data exists. Emergent social science and journalistic research suggests that 
organizational constraints can limit individual lawyers’ autonomy to make 
decisions in particular office environments.61 This includes the hierarchical 
positioning of supervisors within units and divisions with the capacity to 
approve and reallocate work responsibilities.62 These types of organizational 
differences, of course, vary between offices and districts. 
Legal scholars have also observed a relationship between sentencing 
regime changes and prosecutors’ exercise of discretion during plea 
agreement discussions.63 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 aimed to 
reduce disparate sentences among similarly situated defendants by requiring 
 
also have discretion to bring charges in federal (rather than state) court, where a conviction may result in 
a longer sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The fact that a 
greater sentence will result from a federal conviction than from a state conviction alone does not provide 
a basis to challenge an indictment.”). 
 56 See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 840–
41. 
 57 United States v. Valle, 697 F.2d 152, 154 (6th Cir. 1983) (“The fundamental principle of separation 
of powers requires that the executive branch alone, not the judiciary, wield the authority to dismiss 
prosecutions for reasons other than legal insufficiency or an abuse of the prosecutorial function.”) 
 58 Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 233, 236 n.687 (2012). 
 59 See John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1239, 
1250 (2012) (analyzing data collected by the National Center for State Courts, which has records on 
criminal court felony filing numbers for thirty-four states between 1994 and 2008, and noting the dearth 
of available data on prosecutorial decision-making). 
 60 See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice 
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 678 (1995) (noting that the basis of the author’s transformed academic 
opinion of federal prosecutors stemmed from his previous employment as an AUSA). 
 61 See Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context: Influences on 
Prosecutorial Disclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 269, 279–
89 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012); see also Jeffrey Toobin, Casualties of Justice, NEW 
YORKER (Jan. 3, 2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/03/casualties-of-justice 
[https://perma.cc/P4GG-54M5] (discussing Nicholas Marsh’s participation in the prosecution of Senator 
Ted Stevens and noting the behind-the-scenes front office decisions that shifted prosecutors’ roles in the 
trial). 
 62 See Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 61, at 282–84; see also Toobin, supra note 61. 
 63 See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN 
AMERICA 210, 212 (2003) (“[I]n any plea negotiation, the prosecutor’s power to promise the defendant a 
particular sentence in exchange for his plea would be greater than before . . . .”). 
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that judges impose sentences recommended by the United States Sentencing 
Commission.64 Though designed by Congress to reduce judicial discretion 
during sentencing,65 critics have argued that the Sentencing Guidelines and 
the mandatory sentencing schemes, in particular, increase prosecutors’ 
influence on defendants’ charges and plea agreements.66 Though judges have 
tended to depart downward from sentence recommendations since the United 
States v. Booker67 decision made guidelines advisory,68 their discretion to 
sentence above the guidelines range can increase prosecutors’ leverage 
during plea agreement discussions.69 
Others contend that prosecutorial discretion can be an engine of 
reform.70 After former Attorneys General Eric Holder and Loretta Lynch 
implemented a “Smart on Crime” initiative that called on prosecutors to 
consider defendants’ individual characteristics when bringing charges, there 
was a demonstrable shift in charging decisions.71 Prosecutors directed 
attention to violent offenses and avoided those that triggered mandatory 
minimum sentences.72 This outcome may be viewed as evidence that policy 
 
 64 See Edward M. Kennedy, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 32 FED. B. NEWS & J. 62, 63 (1985). 
 65 See William Braniff, Local Discretion, Prosecutorial Choices and the Sentencing Guidelines, 
5 FED. SENT’G REP. 309, 309 (1993) (“Congress’ main purpose in establishing the Sentencing 
Commission [was] to . . . avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar 
criminal records . . . .”). 
 66 See Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal Jury Trial: From Trial 
Judges to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 132–36 (2018) (highlighting that prosecutors 
have increased influence on defendants’ charges and plea agreements as evidenced by the uptick in the 
total amount of plea agreements, the emphasis on sentencing hearings, and the more collaborative 
interactions between the prosecution and defense counsel that has ensued following the enactment of the 
Sentencing Guidelines and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)); Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, 
To Fear Judging No More: Recommendations for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 11 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 187, 187 (1998) (arguing that mandatory sentencing schemes “inevitably shift power toward 
prosecutors” who know the sentencing rules in advance and can adjust the charging decisions, among 
others, accordingly). 
 67 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 68 Norman C. Bay, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Post-Booker World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 549, 
550 (2006). 
 69 See id. at 574. 
 70 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The “Smart on Crime” Prosecutor, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905, 909 
(2012) (contending prosecutors’ responsibility to seek justice extends to improving the criminal justice 
system more broadly). 
 71 See Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 811, 825 (2017) (citing Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 




 72 See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, New Smart on Crime Data Reveals 
Federal Prosecutors Are Focused on More Significant Drug Cases and Fewer Mandatory Minimums for 
Drug Defendants (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-smart-crime-data-reveals-federal-
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initiatives can influence lawyers’ decisions. However, the policies 
prosecutors consider when making decisions about indictments to bring or 
sentences to recommend are not limited to defendants’ individual 
characteristics.73 Given this room for variation and independent 
considerations, writing on prosecutorial discretion is inexorably bound up in 
discussions of prosecutorial ethics, often emphasizing the potential for 
misconduct and abuse of power.74 
In light of falling public jury trial numbers and renewed concern about 
the extent and ends of prosecutorial discretion, it is important to evaluate the 
factors that influence prosecutors’ decisions to indict and what sentences to 
recommend. The present study addresses such gaps by focusing on 
prosecutors’ preparation of criminal and civil cases. 
II. METHODS 
This Article draws on research in a United States Attorney’s office. It 
included semi-structured interviews with 133 AUSAs.75 I carried out these 
interviews incrementally and cross-sectionally over a five-year period, 
beginning in May of 2013.76 The interviews encompassed prosecutors with 
varying levels of jury trial experience in both the criminal and civil divisions 
of the office, and irrespective of whether a particular AUSA was involved in 
a trial at the time. 
To protect their privacy, I assigned a randomly generated two-letter 
code to each interviewee (e.g., AA, AB, AC . . . ) so as not to identify them, 
 
prosecutors-are-focused-more-significant-drug-cases-and [https://perma.cc/SVC4-HA3G] (noting the 
decrease in federal drug cases involving low-level, nonviolent drug offenders). 
 73 For example, elected and appointed prosecutors, both state and federal, often take a resource-
conscious approach to managing their caseloads. Fairfax, supra note 70, at 909. 
 74 See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 
16 (2007) (noting that even well-meaning prosecutors’ routine work can result in unjust charging 
decisions and plea agreements, among other examples); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996) (arguing that prosecutors must stop abusing their 
discretion and make more responsible public policy choices in order to limit their use of already scarce 
prison resources). 
 75 Semi-structured interviews, as deployed in this study, were characterized by open-ended interview 
questions that were not guided by a strict set of written questions or prompts. I asked all interviewees 
who consented to participate in the study to generally comment on the types of cases they worked on, the 
extent to which they had tried cases before juries, and the nature of their legal practice before working at 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office. All interviewees and the cases they described have been anonymized for the 
purpose of conveying their generalized reflections and decision-making processes. 
 76 This meant that in the course of my doctoral study I attempted to contact and sit down with each 
AUSA in the Office’s criminal and civil division to the extent possible. My selection of interviewees was 
often informed by the recommendation of past interviewees that I contact particular colleagues by email. 
With the exception of former AUSAs who were not employed in the Office during the research period, 
most interviewees took place in person and ranged from ten minutes to two hours. 
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their cases, or the district in which they work by name or other identifying 
characteristic. I also modified easily identifiable features of cases and 
redacted specific dates of office activities and interactions. To the extent that 
quotations appear in this Article, they have been modified. The purpose of 
these references is to highlight and tease out generalizable formulations that 
emerged as typical and representative of AUSAs who dealt with similar 
cases, experiences, and ethical questions. 
With the support of a National Science Foundation (NSF) grant, I 
returned to the office between 2015 and 2017 to conduct additional 
interviews, which took place at various points during prosecutors’ 
involvement in cases at different stages of preparation. During this period of 
follow-up study, my selection of interviewees was influenced by court 
proceedings and interactions I observed during meetings I was invited to 
participate in. The generalized reflections that were shared with me in these 
contexts are de-identified and anonymized for the purposes of my analysis 
here.77 
The study was governed by an Institutional Review Board (IRB)-
approved protocol titled “An Ethnographic Study of Lay Participation in the 
United States Criminal Justice System.” Following the convention of 
ethnographic studies, and in accordance with the protocol, oral consent was 
obtained from all interviewees with the understanding that I would not 
include any information that would make it possible to identify them in any 
publication or presentation. 
The insights gleaned from this research offer crucial insight into legal 
technique and decision-making. It therefore answers the call of legal scholars 
who highlight the value of empirical legal research to the study of case 
preparation and trial practice.78 Among its distinctive strengths, qualitative 
research can impact judicial decision-making.79 Anthropological studies of 
trial proceedings and legal practice since the mid-twentieth century have 
 
 77 To the extent I cite interactions with AUSAs, I intend to synthesize general and representative 
types of statements, interests, and concerns they raised. Throughout this study I distinguish interviews 
from other contact I had with AUSAs both in and out of the office. References to “discussions” thus 
encompasses both one-on-one conversations with prosecutors as well as my participation in conversations 
in the context of group meetings. 
 78 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
119, 135 (2002); Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush to Judgment, 
80 MICH. L. REV. 68, 69 (1981) (“[D]ebate about the right to jury trial in complex [civil] cases is informed 
more by intuitions and assumptions than by systematic knowledge.”). 
 79 See, e.g., Richard Ashby Wilson, Expert Evidence on Trial: Social Researchers in the International 
Criminal Courtroom, 43 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 1, 2–3 (2016) (noting the more prevalent citation and greater 
influence of qualitative social science research in international criminal court opinions than quantitative 
social science expertise). 
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included ethnographic research on American capital trials,80 asylum 
proceedings,81 tribal courts,82 international tribunals,83 and the particular 
social contexts in which litigants articulate grievances.84 In the context of 
this study, in particular, anthropological research methods were essential. 
This is because the impact of the right to a jury trial on legal practice is an 
empirical question that cannot be answered by caseload statistics or 
quantitative research alone, due to its implications for our entire legal 
culture. In addition to its practical fact-finding role, the jury has long been 
inflected with distinct values, commitments, and perceived incentives for 
litigants.85 This includes the jury system’s status—or at least aspiration—to 
be a truly democratic institution that places power in ordinary people’s hands 
so long as minimal requirements related to citizenship, age, literacy, and 
residency are met.86 
In contextualizing attorneys’ decisions, ethnographic research, like the 
trial itself, can bring greater transparency to the work of individual 
prosecutors who exercise wide discretion in their work with limited public 
oversight.87 Unlike research on the legal profession that utilizes post hoc 
surveys or questionnaires related to hypothetical cases, this focus on the 
professional self-understanding of prosecutors turns its attention outward to 
social explanations of decision-making rather than toward “invisible,” 
internal, or unconscious domains of judgment.88 It thus offers a window into 
the process by which individual prosecutors articulate rationales for their 
conduct. In the absence of such an approach, studies of prosecutorial 
discretion can misleadingly presume that prosecutors are monolithic law 
 
 80 See generally ROBIN CONLEY, CONFRONTING THE DEATH PENALTY: HOW LANGUAGE 
INFLUENCES JURORS IN CAPITAL CASES (2016). 
 81 See Susan Bibler Coutin, The Oppressed, the Suspect, and the Citizen: Subjectivity in Competing 
Accounts of Political Violence, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 63, 81–88 (2001). 
 82 See generally JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION: THE LANGUAGE OF LAW IN HOPI 
TRIBAL COURT (2008). 
 83 See RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, WRITING HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 192–215 
(2011). 
 84 See CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, AND COMMUNITY IN AN 
AMERICAN TOWN 117 (1986); LAWRENCE ROSEN, BARGAINING FOR REALITY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
SOCIAL RELATIONS IN A MUSLIM COMMUNITY 29 (1984). 
 85 See generally JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF 
DEMOCRACY (1994). 
 86 Id. at 2. 
 87 ANN SOUTHWORTH & CATHERINE L. FISK, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: ETHICS IN CONTEMPORARY 
PRACTICE 356–57 (2014); McCoy, supra note 53, at 682. 
 88 See, e.g., David Luban, The Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2010) 
(describing a case in which a prosecutor makes the personal decision to throw a case assigned to him by 
a supervisor due to his conviction that the case was unjust). 
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enforcement agents, rather than individuals who attempt to conscientiously 
carry out their duties.89 
A common thread in anthropological studies of the law is their use of 
ethnography, which has encompassed court observation,90 interviews,91 
archival research,92 and linguistic analysis.93 Building on the work of legal 
anthropologists attentive to lawyers’ everyday work,94 this Article 
demonstrates that focused and localized ethnographic analysis can valuably 
contribute to understandings and assessments of meaningful lay participation 
in the U.S. legal system. 
Researchers who advocate and deploy such an approach emphasize its 
dialogic and reciprocal form, as it is unconstrained by the conventional 
power dynamics of formal interviews.95 After speaking with AUSAs as part 
of this study, I generated anonymous notes, which I coded based on themes 
in the general types of reflections shared with me. For example, when 
AUSAs used the phrase “jury appeal,” as discussed in the next Section, I 
highlighted and assigned a searchable code (e.g., “jury appeal”) to sections 
 
 89 See James Laidlaw, Agency and Responsibility: Perhaps You Can Have Too Much of a Good 
Thing, in ORDINARY ETHICS: ANTHROPOLOGY, LANGUAGE, AND ACTION 143, 152 (Michael Lambek ed., 
2010); see also SOUTHWORTH & FISK, supra note 87, at 336. 
 90 See SUSAN F. HIRSCH, IN THE MOMENT OF GREATEST CALAMITY: TERRORISM, GRIEF, AND A 
VICTIM’S QUEST FOR JUSTICE 149–79 (2006) (describing a national security prosecution that the author 
participated in as a witness despite having conflicting views about the theories advanced and punishment 
sought by the government). 
 91 See WILSON, supra note 83, at 192–215. 
 92 See TOBIAS KELLY, THIS SIDE OF SILENCE: HUMAN RIGHTS, TORTURE, AND THE RECOGNITION OF 
CRUELTY (2012). 
 93 See, e.g., GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY: DISCOURSE IN THE 
WILLIAM KENNEDY SMITH RAPE TRIAL 5 (2001) (delineating focus of research as an examination of the 
way that “linguistic processes of persuasion participate in the ongoing construction and contestation of 
legal reality”); ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A 
LAWYER” 3 (2007) (describing the researcher’s “focus on language as the window to legal 
epistemology”). 
 94 See MATOESIAN, supra note 93, at 106 (“I show how legal discourse actually unfolds in the situated 
details of communicative practice. . . . In the process, I hope to illuminate taken-for-granted legal 
processes and language use as an interactive phenomenon of power.”); SUSAN URMSTON PHILIPS, 
IDEOLOGY IN THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES: HOW JUDGES PRACTICE LAW, POLITICS, AND COURTROOM 
CONTROL, at xii (1998) (noting that “the spoken law really has an interpretive life and a culture of its own 
and is not just a reflection of the written law” in describing her empirical attention to judges’ real-time 
discourse); RICHLAND, supra note 82, at 7 (“[W]e can only reach a proper understanding of notions of 
custom and tradition in contemporary tribal jurisprudence by exploring them in the circumstances of their 
use, as they both shape and are shaped by the courtroom talk that forms the center of contemporary tribal 
law.”). 
 95 See CHARLES L. BRIGGS, LEARNING HOW TO ASK: A SOCIOLINGUISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE ROLE 
OF THE INTERVIEW IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 7 (1986); RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE & TRUTH: THE 
REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 207 (1993). 
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of notes for later aggregation and analysis. This allowed me to identify 
unprompted patterns in AUSAs’ reflection about their cases. 
Case studies of prosecutorial practice and strategy in particular 
jurisdictions have been deployed by interdisciplinary legal scholars to great 
effect.96 The U.S. Attorney’s Office that is the focus of this study was located 
in a district that contained a mix of rural and urban counties and had a varied 
caseload. The general types of criminal cases that were described to me in 
the course of conversations about voir dire ranged from those involving 
allegations of employment discrimination to capital murder—characteristic 
of offices in numerous federal jurisdictions across the country. 
The aim of this case study is thus to highlight and consider the 
implications of prosecutors’ attention to jurors, which they viewed as a 
central feature of their jobs. Future research and analysis of prosecutorial 
decision-making may fruitfully explore whether these insights have more 
generalized application to state prosecutors’ offices and defense attorneys’ 
work, among other legal and nonlegal settings. 
III. FINDINGS 
The study revealed two categories of information that help explain the 
role of the lay public in prosecutorial decision-making: first, factors that 
prosecutors understood to influence jury appeal and second, the 
interventions of hypothetical jurors in prosecutorial techniques. 
A. Factors That Influence Jury Appeal 
Prosecutors explained that they often grounded concerns about their 
cases in jurors’ likely opinions of them.97 As prosecutors decided whether to 
bring charges against a defendant, for example, there was frequent talk of the 
“jury appeal” of evidence and witnesses.98 In some prosecutors’ 
formulations, assessing jury appeal was likened to asking, “If I were a juror, 
 
 96 For case study research on the subjects of plea agreements, for example, see THEODORE N. 
FERDINAND, BOSTON’S LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS, 1814–1850, at 36–37 (1992) (describing the study’s 
focus on the “professionalization of the bench” in Boston and shifting role of the lower courts in light of 
this); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880, at 
9 (2000) (“The weaknesses of the literature on criminal courts convinced me that a city rather than a 
larger political jurisdiction was the appropriate unit for study . . . .”); and Mary E. Vogel, The Social 
Origins of Plea Bargaining: An Approach to the Empirical Study of Discretionary Leniency?, 35 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 201, 209 (2008) (pinpointing the emergence of plea bargaining in Massachusetts in the 1830s and 
1840s based on data gathered from Boston’s lower court). 
 97 See, e.g., Interviews with CO, DH, DN & EQ, AUSAs (2013–2017). As described in the methods 
section, each AUSA I spoke to as part of my doctoral research was randomly assigned a two-letter code, 
the key of which is confidential as per IRB requirements. 
 98 See, e.g., Interviews with AH, AI, AN, AU, AZ, BF, BN, BR, BS, CB, CE, CR, CV, CW, CZ, DB, 
DE, DH, DK, DO & DU, AUSAs (2013). 
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what would I think?” or a practice of weighing whether a “hypothetical 
juror” would feel that a case should not be prosecuted even if it legally could 
be.99 As a practical matter, discussion of jury appeal offered a resource for 
articulating concerns and ambivalence about cases from a position of 
detachment.100 These concerns sometimes informed prosecutors’ decisions 
to dismiss cases.101 
Prosecutors also described cases they felt lacked jury appeal. They 
frequently cited allegations of “structuring” as examples of such cases. In 
structuring cases, defendants are charged with deliberately limiting the 
increments of money involved in bank transactions to avoid triggering a 
federal reporting requirement.102 As stand-alone cases, some prosecutors 
worried they would not appeal to hypothetical jurors.103 One theme in a 
number of prosecutors’ reflections on the subject was the difficulty of 
explaining to jurors that a law that might sound like a tedious regulatory 
requirement had an important rationale. When charging a defendant with 
structuring some prosecutors would therefore go out of their way to charge 
another underlying crime—like a larger financial scheme or terrorist plot, for 
example.104 When structuring cases were charged on their own, however, 
jurors were imagined to be less receptive. Another prosecutor suggested that 
jurors might worry that their own failure to fill out paperwork be considered 
a violation of the law, making them reluctant to view a similarly situated 
defendant as blameworthy.105 As several commentaries on structuring 
suggested, prosecutors did not automatically prosecute violations of federal 
law, citing future jurors’ attitudes as grounds for their decisions. 
Commonsense sources of skepticism and concern about a case were 
thus projected onto external decision-making agents. It was not enough to 
demonstrably prove that a federal law had been broken. The future jurors 
these (and other) prosecutors imagined might feel that such a crime did not 
warrant punishment. Reference to hypothetical jurors thus aided 
 
 99 See, e.g., Interviews with BF & BK, AUSAs (2013); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 85, at 7 
(reflecting on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with future jurors’ hypothetical interpretations in 
mind). 
 100 Anna Offit, With Jurors in Mind: An Ethnographic Study of Prosecutors’ Narratives, LAW, 
CULTURE & HUMANITIES (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5–6) (on file with Northwestern University 
Law Review). 
 101 See, e.g., Interviews with DH & DN, AUSAs (2013). In 2014, federal prosecutors in the U.S. 
dismissed 6822 cases—a figure that does not reflect the number of cases that were referred elsewhere or 
set aside as investigations were underway. 2014 FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE STATISTICS, supra note 42. 
 102 See 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3) (2012) (prohibiting any person from structuring transactions “with one 
or more domestic financial institutions” for the purpose of evading reporting requirements). 
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formulations of the de minimis character of cases; even cases that technically 
could be prosecuted were not always perceived as justifying expending the 
resources of the office.106 
An example of such a case involved the circulation of fake prescription 
pads by a retired pharmacist. Here, law enforcement agents intended to put 
a tracker on the packages containing the counterfeit prescriptions before they 
were confiscated.107 Prosecuting the unlawful receipt of one individual’s 
prescription pads without further evidence of illegally obtained drugs or 
victims, however, was not something the prosecutor who learned about this 
case imagined future jurors would care about. This contrasted with a jury-
appealing case he did imagine—involving a more coordinated effort to 
prosecute a major pharmacy chain for supplying prescription drugs to a drug 
trafficking ring.108 
Other factors that contributed to prosecutors’ perceptions of jury appeal 
included the intelligibility of the evidence they would present to jurors, the 
credibility of potential witnesses, and the sympathy jurors might feel for the 
defendants or victims of alleged crimes. 
1. Intelligibility of Alleged Crimes and Evidence 
Prosecutors often interpreted the questions that grand jurors raised 
about their cases as indicative of future trial jurors’ sources of confusion.109 
If grand jurors asked hundreds of questions, a prosecutor explained, she 
would take that as a warning that twelve future trial jurors might have 
broader concerns.110 Though federal prosecutors are not constitutionally 
 
 106 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 3-3.9(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993): 
The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support. The 
prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest 
decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a 
conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising 
his or her discretion are: 
(i) the prosecutor’s reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty; 
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense; 
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular offense or the 
offender; 
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant; 
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify; 
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others; and 
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction. 
 107 See, e.g., Interview with BS, AUSA (2013). 
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required to present exculpatory evidence to grand jurors,111 the office that 
was the subject of this study conformed to a stricter internal policy mandated 
by the Department of Justice.112 As a result, grand jurors’ reactions to 
unfavorable evidence were seen as offering practical guidance. Prosecutors 
explained that grand jurors were often viewed as a guide for what trial jurors 
might do. This sometimes led them to ask grand jurors what they thought 
about particular pieces of evidence and how their presentation could be made 
more persuasive.113 Grand juror presentations also helped prosecutors gauge 
how “relevant”114 their evidence would seem to jurors at trial.115 Prosecutors 
thus kept track of grand jurors’ questions, making note of what they might 
need to address through their later questioning of witnesses.116 
Those who worked on cases involving allegations of bribery were 
particularly attuned to the difficulty of explaining why their cases should 
matter to jurors. This was true, for example, of a case in which a local police 
officer accepted money from people he knew well. Jurors might interpret 
these kinds of transactions, some worried, as a hospitable gesture among 
individuals who knew each other well. Another prosecutor encouraged 
agents to record conversations whenever possible because the challenge of 
proving a defendant’s state of mind boiled down to jurors’ competing 
interpretations of language.117 
Unlike gun cases or child abuse prosecutions that appeared to have 
“clear-cut bad guys,” prosecutors noted that politicians accepted money all 
the time. The challenge was to prove they took money in exchange for 
carrying out official acts.118 For this reason, prosecutors focused on making 
the significance of public corruption cases apparent to jurors in order to 
combat jurors’ potential perceptions of “how business gets done” in politics. 
In the context of preparing such cases, prosecutors thus imagined the 
impressions and interpretations of future jurors continually.119 
In the context of discussions about voir dire and jury appeal, some felt 
they had no choice but to prosecute cases that would be unappealing to the 
 
 111 See Ali Lombardo, Note, The Grand Jury and Exculpatory Evidence: Should the Prosecutor Be 
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jurors they imagined. This included national security cases in which agents 
could not legally divulge the investigative techniques they deployed to lay 
decision-makers (and sometimes prosecutors) due to statutory constraints.120 
Some prosecutors considered jurors’ incomplete access to—or lack of 
awareness of—classified information and evidence-gathering methods when 
deciding whether a case should be prosecuted.121 
One illustrative commentary emphasized the importance of analyzing 
cases with reference to the evidence jurors would actually see rather than the 
full universe of evidence known to those organizing a prosecution.122 In 
some cases this meant prosecuting suspected terrorists with a lesser offense 
like tax evasion while considering how such cases might “look” to a jury.123 
Cases that involved prosecuting drug dealers or gang members were also 
cause for concern due to jury considerations. The effect of aggregating 
defendants under a racketeering law, for example, led some prosecutors to 
worry that jurors would lack sympathy for victims who engaged in violent 
criminal activity themselves.124 
Other prosecutors viewed hypothetical jurors’ anticipated indifference 
to their cases as a challenge, because their job was to make jurors care. The 
onus should be on a prosecutor, the theory went, to explain the consequences 
of behavior that might seem innocuous to a lay outsider.125 Other prosecutors 
shared the view that any case could be made to appeal to a juror if it could 
be presented as bringing a defendant’s greed to light.126 To the extent that 
particular white-collar crimes were unfamiliar to jurors, the burden of 
explaining why they should be taken seriously rested with the prosecutor 
who might try them. Hypothetical jurors thus prompted reflection on how to 
articulate the societal implications of different allegations of wrongdoing. By 
one prosecutor’s account, this exercise involved asking herself, “Why should 
I care about this? From someone shoplifting bubble gum to committing 
murder—and everything in between.”127 
2. Credibility of Witnesses 
Another common theme in prosecutors’ reflections on recurrent jury 
concerns related to perceptions of witness credibility and character. This is 
because prosecutors often selected or substituted witnesses for one another 
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based on jurors’ anticipated impressions of them. To this end, a majority of 
the prosecutors I interviewed or assisted with case preparation reflected on 
the question of whether jurors would like or dislike particular witnesses, 
including those who were otherwise providing evidence that was important 
to a case.128 
When there was concern that a witness might come across as abrasive, 
rude, or incredible, prosecutors considered how to elicit information on 
direct examination that might change these impressions.129 Even an honest 
person might appear to a juror as if he were not telling the truth.130 Rather 
than critique a witness’s testimony on its own terms, prosecutors framed their 
guidance in terms that emphasized what a shame it would be if police officer 
witnesses, for example, lost future cases because jurors did not believe their 
testimony. Time and again, concern about jurors’ potential skepticism 
toward law enforcement officers informed prosecutors’ discussions of whom 
they should choose to testify.131 
Prosecutors also described their efforts to anticipate jurors’ responses 
to cooperating witnesses. In light of such witnesses’ own criminal conduct 
and interest in reducing their punishment, AUSAs expected jurors to have 
difficulty taking them at their word.132 This led some to feel reluctant about 
taking cases to trial that relied exclusively on the testimony of a cooperator 
and view corroboration of such testimony through law enforcement agents’ 
records, for example, to be essential.133 To the extent that prosecutors 
suspected that jurors would dislike “scumbag” cooperators, some worried 
that their testimony might “tank” if jurors were to view their potential for a 
reduced sentence to be unjust.134 Others worried that laypeople might fail to 
understand why a cooperating witness could be—or should be—essential to 
prosecutions at all. 
Such a concern arose in a case that relied on the testimony of a 
cooperator who was a foreign national who had failed to register as a sex 
offender under federal law. Before committing to put this witness on the 
 
 128 See, e.g., Interviews with AA, AY, BQ & DI, AUSAs (2013). 
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stand, prosecutors expressed concern about how evidence of this witness’s 
past wrongdoing might “play” to future jurors.135 In this context, prosecutors 
assigned to the case were relieved to discover a family conflict at the heart 
of the defendant’s wrongdoing; while residing outside the United States, he 
had impregnated a younger teenage cousin. Though his underlying sex crime 
did not cast the cooperator in a flattering light, the context of his prior 
conviction amidst familial strife was imagined to be more palatable to future 
jurors. 
Although this case, like most in the office, did not proceed to trial, 
jurors’ imagined misgivings about the cooperating witness informed 
prosecutors’ case preparation. One prosecutor, for example, indicated that 
knowledge of witnesses’ strengths and weaknesses was an essential part of 
considering the type of impact evidentiary presentations might have on 
jurors.136 This case contrasted with others in which prosecutors felt that 
cooperating witnesses could not take the stand under any circumstance due, 
for example, to the incendiary and indefensible nature of emails that might 
come to light during trial, calling their character into question.137 
Despite believing that cooperating witnesses would testify truthfully as 
a condition of the leniency prosecutors could ask of a sentencing judge, 
prosecutors worried that jurors would view cooperators less generously. As 
laypeople understand them, cooperators might appear to be murderers 
testifying to get less jail time—or people who convinced others to commit 
crimes to help the government build a bigger case.138 Though prosecutors 
conceded their own inclination to believe witnesses whom they met and 
spoke with dozens of times, they acknowledged the difficulty that knowledge 
of numerous lies might pose for jurors who would not be satisfied by the 
corroboration, for example, of other drug dealers.139 One prosecutor 
approached this concern by attempting to put herself in the position of a juror 
hearing such a witness for the first time without the benefit of protracted 
pretrial contact. This imaginative exercise helped her prepare cases, 
recognizing that jurors would understandably be skeptical, particularly in 
light of judges’ explicit instructions that cooperating witnesses’ desire for 
leniency could present a conflict of interest and should be weighed carefully 
in evaluating their credibility.140 
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Stories of acquittals in cases with highly unappealing cooperators were 
shared, anecdotally, as warnings of the perils of disregarding jurors’ possible 
perceptions of witnesses before indicting defendants.141 One prosecutor’s 
recollection of a particularly offensive cooperating witness revealed an 
overriding concern with the “optics” of cases to lay onlookers. Part of the 
evidence in an illustrative case involved a cooperator who used racist 
language in a text message, which, a prosecutor thought, inherently 
undermined the case. Any attempt at justifying or minimizing such language, 
he explained, would be a “sideshow” if the case proceeded to trial and, 
further, made his support for this witness’s credibility personally 
uncomfortable and indefensible.142 As a general matter, attention to jurors’ 
perceptions of testimony as offensive prompted some AUSAs to ask 
cooperators to think about the language they used during investigations. One 
prosecutor, for example, explicitly told a witness not to curse because—
although this was not improper or illegal—it might not look good to future 
jurors.143 
Prosecutors also evaluated case agents’ character and credibility with 
jurors in mind. As an agent sat across the table from him, one prosecutor 
noted that he routinely considered how grand jurors and potential trial jurors 
might react to particular witnesses.144 Though this AUSA recognized the 
abstractness of this calculation, because he could not possibly anticipate a 
jury’s ultimate makeup, he viewed this assessment comparable to 
assimilating the impression of a “random person off the street” into his own 
evaluation.145 
Arising from this same concern about jurors’ poor opinions of 
witnesses, prosecutors sometimes perceived other law enforcement agents’ 
approaches to cases as insufficiently oriented toward trials, despite the 
necessity of interagency collaboration. Recognizing agencies’ different 
criteria for professional advancement, some prosecutors noted that 
quantitative indices of successful investigations—like arrests—could trump 
other considerations.146 Amplifying this view, another prosecutor explained 
that he would not recommend arresting a target unless he was certain he 
could win at trial.147 
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Some prosecutors thus viewed part of their job as convincing agents 
who were otherwise focused on making arrests to anticipate trials. In some 
cases, prosecutors worried that the professional recognition conferred on 
agents for making probable cause-based arrests encouraged them to keep 
investigations moving—and that in their zeal to make such arrests agents 
might pay less attention to other evidentiary issues they would face at trial.148 
Likewise, some agents who perceived prosecutors to move cases quickly 
expressed appreciation, viewing speed as a sign of competence and 
efficiency.149 One AUSA indicated that she perceived it to be her job to 
consider how evidence would “hold up” to jurors’ scrutiny at trial.150 
In another illustrative account, a prosecutor recalled a meeting in which 
prosecutors’ and case agents’ supervisors met to discuss (and resolve) 
divergent opinions about a case involving the sale of fraudulent lottery 
tickets. This prosecutor’s supervisor planned to assess the case’s strength and 
get everyone on the “same page.”151 Though the prosecutor thought the 
evidence in his case was strong, he noted its complexity. By contrast, from 
the supervising AUSA’s and agent’s perspectives, the case was a “slam 
dunk.”152 
Talk of fictive jurors thus made character assessment a central feature 
of prosecutors’ case preparation. In addition to encompassing the assessment 
of potential witnesses’ character traits, prosecutors readily scrutinized the 
evidentiary orientations of colleagues who carried out investigations and 
made arrests. Points of personal disagreement and competing interpretations 
of the same evidence were thus attributed to detached and hypothetical lay 
critics. 
3. Sympathy for Defendants and Victims 
Another common theme in prosecutors’ reflections on jury selection 
and trial preparation was concern that defendants might elicit sympathy.153 
To this end, a prosecutor recalled a case in which a defendant sounded 
sympathetic during the same video recordings that would be played to jurors 
as evidence of her wrongdoing. While accepting under-the-table payments, 
for example, this defendant asked her accomplices intimate and empathetic 
questions about members of their families. Upon seeing these warm 
exchanges, the prosecutor assigned to the case imagined that future jurors 
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would be drawn to her.154 Likewise, laypeople were imagined to be forgiving 
of those who broke laws to keep electricity running in their businesses, 
employed people during a recession, or looked like scapegoats for more 
culpable individuals who were not indicted.155 A defendant who fraudulently 
gave tax refunds to a poor family, for example, might look more like “Robin 
Hood” than a criminal.156 
Prosecutors’ descriptions of two criminal cases illustrated the role of 
hypothetical jurors in shaping their own perceptions of defendants. In the 
first of these cases, a defendant was charged with failing to report the death 
of his mother and continuing to accept civil service retirement benefits on 
her behalf. The defendant worked as a government mail clerk and used the 
money to support himself and his unemployed niece. Despite this additional 
income, the prosecutor assigned to the case recalled that the defendant was 
elderly and lived in poverty.157 In light of these financially precarious 
circumstances, the prosecutor took into account whether charging the 
defendant before his planned retirement might preclude him from receiving 
pension benefits in the event he was convicted of a felony. Furthermore, 
though some jurors might perceive the defendant to be receiving a great deal 
of money, the prosecutor said he recognized that it was “very little month-
to-month.”158 The country’s difficult economic climate, he worried, would 
make for an unsympathetic jury. Hypothetical jurors’ potentially unjust 
characterization of the evidence, as he understood it, thus guided his sense 
of what a just result would entail for the defendant.159 
In a second case, a prosecutor imagined that jurors’ views might mirror 
those of colleagues she consulted as proxies. A defendant’s distraction on a 
family camping trip in a national park led to the drowning of an unsupervised 
child. The U.S. Attorney at the time assigned the case to a prosecutor who 
recognized its sensitivity. Taking seriously her discretion to prosecute it, the 
AUSA immediately set to work informally surveying colleagues on the 
likely reactions of future jurors—a practice referred to by others as “jury 
testing.”160 
This prosecutor’s first impulse was to speak with members of the 
defendant’s family for a window into the way others assessed her character. 
Was she generally viewed as absentminded? Irresponsible? The consensus 
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seemed to be that she was a conscientious mother—and heartbroken by the 
incident.161 Based on this discovery, the AUSA worried about the polarizing 
nature of the case for future jurors. Though some sympathized with the 
defendant, who had surely suffered, others felt the prosecutor had an 
obligation to demand justice on behalf of a victim who could not speak for 
himself and whose death could easily have been prevented.162 
Drawing on her peers’ divided opinions, she imagined jurors engaged 
in a similarly intractable debate during their deliberations. Though she 
personally felt the case was worthy of prosecution, it seemed clear that 
twelve people were unlikely to agree on the defendant’s guilt.163 When the 
case was ultimately resolved with a guilty plea, the prosecutor was 
relieved—though she disagreed with the judge about the defendant’s 
ultimate punishment. Although both of these cases—like most in the 
office—were resolved by guilty plea rather than jury trial, the prosecutors 
assigned to them eagerly assessed the defendants and victims in their cases 
with continual reference to jurors.164 
In describing other examples of the role of hypothetical jurors, 
prosecutors worried that defendants might appear to be more sympathetic in 
cases with unsympathetic victims. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) came 
up as a frequent example cited by several prosecutors who referred to 
unrelated cases. One prosecutor explained the challenge of combatting an 
attitude that he worried jurors would share. Recognizing, with humor, the 
likelihood of negative juror attitudes toward the IRS, he “bent over 
backwards” to appear fair.165 Another colleague who tried tax cases lamented 
the fact that jurors often failed to distinguish between the IRS and his own 
employer, the Department of Justice. Regardless of the truth of their beliefs, 
he said, he worried jurors would dislike the agency they thought he worked 
for.166 
In addition to thinking about whether a defendant might elicit 
sympathy, prosecutors also considered other emotional responses defendants 
might elicit. In light of jurors’ anticipated moral outrage, prosecutors 
sometimes expressed ambivalence about prosecuting cases that involved 
allegations of child pornography.167 In one case, a prosecutor recalled a story 
in which a prospective juror reportedly responded to a judge with violent 
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outrage upon hearing the allegations in such a case.168 Another prosecutor 
described a case in which a target found with child pornography worked as 
a youth baseball coach. Though the case differed from those typically tried 
in federal court, consideration of jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s 
conduct and victims’ vulnerability informed the decision to prosecute him.169 
In a white-collar case, a prosecutor took comfort in the fact that jurors 
would likely find the defendant in her case distasteful. She explained that she 
had been told that the defendant was a “dick.” He was tall, looked imposing, 
and wore expensive suits. It would be great for her case, she thought, if he 
brought the lack of contrition that characterized his everyday demeanor into 
the courtroom with him.170 This, after all, might bolster the government’s 
arguments about his greed. She compared the case to another she tried in 
which the defendant was an elderly woman who would flaunt her wealth 
outside of court while hobbling into court with a walker during trial.171 The 
trial team shared similar concerns about a defendant’s appearance in advance 
of jury selection in a public corruption case. Here, they described the 
defendant as someone who looked as though he had stepped out of a fashion 
magazine. He presented himself like a person with modest beginnings, 
having “pulled himself up from his bootstraps.”172 
As these examples suggest, hypothetical jurors gave prosecutors a 
framework for scrutinizing the jury appeal of their cases. This analysis could 
then serve as a metric for measuring the intelligibility of charges, a basis for 
contesting the credibility of witnesses, and a standard for considering which 
defendants were worthy of prosecution. As a morally malleable construct, 
hypothetical jurors also aided prosecutors’ management of ongoing 
investigations, evaluations of the sufficiency of available evidence, and 
approaches to plea agreement discussions. 
B. Interventions of Hypothetical Jurors in Prosecutorial Technique 
By prosecutors’ accounts, criminal cases fell into two broad categories: 
“reactive” and “proactive.” In “reactive” cases, an alleged crime had taken 
place (e.g., a person was stopped at an international airport with a fake 
passport) and was phoned in to an on-duty prosecutor. The prosecutor who 
received this call was tasked with evaluating it and recommending a course 
of action to his or her supervisor. A relevant consideration when assessing 
these potential cases was a future jury’s likely reaction to them and the 
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evidence involved. Because the prosecutors “on duty” to evaluate such cases 
would be assigned to them from intake through trial, they emphasized the 
importance of considering the cases’ shortcomings with reference to lay 
decision-makers.173 
“Proactive” cases, in contrast, reached prosecutors (either directly or 
through their supervisors) as investigations were ongoing. These cases 
required collaboration with law enforcement agents who made arrests, 
searched targets’ homes, interviewed potential witnesses, and continued to 
gather evidence. Over the course of these working relationships, prosecutors 
sometimes advised agents about the weight, necessity, and admissibility of 
evidence, as well as their own ability to prove each element of the crimes 
they would charge. In conjunction with case agents, prosecutors made 
decisions about investigative techniques with hypothetical jurors’ 
perspectives in mind—including at the earliest phases of an investigation—
and assessed whether adequate evidence had been gathered. Prosecutors 
were also alert to whether they could explain the significance of their 
evidence to jurors, which informed their discussions of potential plea 
deals.174 
1. Investigating Criminal Cases 
Most prosecutors indicated in semi-structured interviews that they 
regularly considered jurors’ impressions of evidence as investigations were 
underway.175 This prompted greater reflexivity as prosecutors evaluated the 
investigations-in-progress that agents presented to them.176 To this end, a 
prosecutor reflected that jurors served as a check on his personal decision-
making process that prompted him to ensure he had enough “at every stage” 
with an eye toward what evidence would be presented to jurors at trial.177 
According to this AUSA, case preparation was tethered to a future 
hypothetical trial in which jurors were the arbiters of even the most 
preliminary assessments of evidence. Prosecutors then used this framework 
to figure out organizational strategies for their investigations—ranging from 
the selection and preparation of witnesses to decisions about particular 
investigative techniques to employ or avoid.178 
This focus extended to prosecutors’ discretionary decisions related to 
witnesses a prosecutor would try to “flip”—or have cooperate against the 
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 177 See, e.g., Interview with AW, AUSA (2013). 
 178 See, e.g., Interview with BG, AUSA (2013). 
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target of a prosecution—as well as to considerations of which individuals 
might testify on the government’s behalf. As a general rule, informed by the 
intuitions they imputed to lay decision-makers, prosecutors were reluctant to 
ask individuals with large roles in criminal schemes to testify against those 
in lower level roles.179 In a fraud case, for example, a prosecutor lamented 
the fact that a low-level employee had been charged.180 Amplifying this 
sentiment, other colleagues worried that future jurors would be as leery of 
company leaders turning on subordinates as they would be of family 
members testifying against one another.181 
Consideration of future jurors also extended to prosecutors’ views on 
how the targets of their investigations should be monitored and arrested. One 
prosecutor described his horror upon learning that a law enforcement agent 
had been following a lawyer in an airplane. Among the reasons he put an end 
to the investigation, he cited jurors’ likely intuition that this approach to 
monitoring a target was out of sync with reasonable law enforcement 
practices. He concluded that a future juror, like him, would wonder whether 
an agent deploying this technique under the circumstances was out of his 
mind.182 
Other prosecutors’ ideas about how targets should be apprehended 
reflected their understanding of ethical norms they believed future jurors 
would share. As an example, a prosecutor described a white-collar case that 
involved a business owner who was suspected of being involved in a 
fraudulent scheme. After learning that another law enforcement agent 
planned to arrest this individual at work, he proposed an alternative that he 
believed would be more palatable to future jurors. His impulse was to 
imagine a jury, months down the road, hearing a defendant argue that he was 
innocent—did nothing wrong—yet had arresting agents destroy his career 
and humiliate him in front of his coworkers. At the end of the day, this 
prosecutor recognized that it would be left to him to defend aggressive tactics 
in front of jurors, which strengthened his sense of the importance of orienting 
one’s work around jurors from the inception of the case through its 
conclusion.183 
Ideas about jurors’ potential interpretations also intervened as 
prosecutors considered whether particular investigative approaches might 
violate lay citizens’ ideas about fair evidence-gathering practices. Here, 
again, jury concerns effectively amended the enforcement of federal laws, 
 
 179 See, e.g., Interview with DE, AUSA (2017). 
 180 See, e.g., Interview with DH, AUSA (2017). 
 181 See, e.g., Interviews with AA & DN, AUSAs (2017); see also Offit, supra note 100, at 19. 
 182 See, e.g., Interview with AM, AUSA (2013). 
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and particularly in the context of drug crimes. Two undercover narcotics 
investigation practices that were subject to scrutiny due to jury-related 
concerns included offering to sell drugs to suspected drug dealers and 
offering resources to rob other drug dealers. In the first type of case, 
prosecutors worried that agents’ deployment of a tactic known as a 
“reverse”184— in which undercover agents posed as drug dealers and arrested 
drug-purchasing targets—would be perceived by jurors as unfair.185 When 
law enforcement agents offered to put drugs in people’s hands as a way of 
combatting their circulation, prosecutors thought jurors would be skeptical. 
Although no drugs actually changed hands during these investigations, 
prosecutors were more confident that jurors would see the criminality of 
targets’ conduct as outweighing the distasteful circumstances of such arrests 
when agents offered to sell drugs for large sums of money.186 
Another investigative technique that prosecutors scrutinized with 
reference to jurors was designed to target violent criminals. Referred to in 
some jurisdictions as a “home invasion reversal,” such investigations often 
began with an undercover agent alerting targets to an opportunity to rob a 
local drug dealer’s stash, which in reality was a location controlled by the 
agent. The agents would set a time and place for the theft. Recognizing that 
hypothetical jurors might perceive this technique as deceptive or inducing 
otherwise law-abiding people to commit crimes,187 the prosecutors who 
weighed in on these investigations asked the agents they worked with to give 
targets several opportunities to change their minds and walk away, on video, 
before arresting them. In some cases, investigations were abandoned 
altogether. When a target whom agents approached to carry out a robbery 
arrived on a bicycle and appeared harmless to an AUSA, for example, this 
prosecutor recommended the investigation be called off, imagining future 
jurors’ potential concerns about entrapment or government overreaching. 
When targets arrived with bulletproof vests, weapons of their own, and 
plastic wrist ties to immobilize victims, however, future jurors were believed 
 
 184 Or “reverse sting” operation. See Adam Longo, Police “Reverse Sting” Operations Under 
Scrutiny by AZ Supreme Court, CBS 5 PHOENIX (Apr. 28, 2013), https://www.azfamily.com/news/police-
reverse-sting-operations-under-scrutiny-by-az-supreme-court/article_a52049a6-7f37-54f6-a3d0-
fe7bb50d56f9.html [https://perma.cc/V8TK-MF2Q]. 
 185 See, e.g., Interview with AH, AUSA (2013). 
 186 Id. (noting that law-abiding citizens were less likely to walk around with $500,000 in cash than 
drug dealers). 
 187 Prosecutors I spoke with about this tactic cited a USA Today article that described “home 
invasion” prosecution techniques in detail as evidence that future jurors—and laypeople generally—had 
likely formed impressions about them. See Brad Heath, ATF Uses Fake Drugs, Big Bucks to Snare 
Suspects, USA TODAY (June 28, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/27/atf-
stash-houses-sting-usa-today-investigation/2457109 [https://perma.cc/V9J9-U8S5]. 
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to perceive the defendants as dangerous and violent and therefore approve of 
the tactics used to arrest them.188 
By prosecutors’ accounts, the gaze of imagined jurors thus created a 
professionally acceptable opening for prosecutors to articulate extralegal and 
subjective concerns about ongoing and planned investigations. 
2. Approaching Plea Agreement Discussions 
Prosecutors’ assessments of the strength of their evidence, perceived 
seriousness of the cases charged, and unsympathetic character of defendants 
often entered plea agreement discussions explicitly. A federal prosecutor 
who tried drug and violent crime cases that involved wiretap evidence, for 
example, routinely explained to defendants that in his eleven years of 
experience he had never seen a jury acquit a defendant in federal court. He 
indicated that in these cases deliberations would not be long because wiretap 
and video evidence would make it easy for jurors to understand.189 Appealing 
to the accessibility and clarity of the evidence to future jurors, he then invited 
defendants to elicit their attorneys’ perspectives on how jurors would likely 
view the case. 
Another prosecutor who tried gang cases made similar appeals during 
plea agreement discussions. To the extent that jurors would see evidence that 
the defendant committed violent crimes near an elementary school, a 
prosecutor recalled conveying to a defendant that jurors’ disdain for the 
defendant would be immediate.190 Unlike some of his colleagues, who 
imagined particular types of people who might be empaneled as jurors, this 
prosecutor imagined his future jurors as a generalized “collective.” He 
pictured an “abstract model jury in [his] head” all intently listening to 
everything he had to say. To the extent that he viewed evidence in his cases 
as strong, he imagined that jurors would do the same.191 
In a tax fraud case, another prosecutor encouraged a defendant to 
consider how a jury would view her conduct if the case went to trial. A large 
part of his interactions with the defendant thus involved imagining jurors’ 
likely perspectives.192 In this AUSA’s view, a future jury would have “no 
patience” for a person who sought to enhance her material well-being by 
stealing federal tax dollars. The defendant’s ultimate decision to accept a 
plea offer, in his view, was prompted by the adoption of his narrative about 
fictive lay decision-makers. 
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 189 See, e.g., Interview with AD, AUSA (2017).  
 190 See, e.g., Interview with DH, AUSA (2013). 
 191 See, e.g., Interview with AD, AUSA (2013). 
 192 See, e.g., Interview with AF, AUSA (2013). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1104 
When prosecutors felt that cases or charges lacked jury appeal, pursuing 
plea agreements was a potential source of anxiety.193 To this end, prosecutors 
contended that it was best to negotiate plea deals from the position of being 
prepared to try a case.194 As one AUSA put it, cases with “zero jury appeal” 
could lead judges to take a hostile attitude toward cases, let alone jurors.195 
Another prosecutor said that he felt he “knew” when he would not have the 
jury on his side and that proceeding to trial would be risky.196 
As a matter of office practice, the plea deals that prosecutors proposed 
to defendants during initial proffer or “show and tell” meetings did not 
improve from those they would offer as trials approached. When prosecutors 
learned information about defendants that they believed would make them 
seem more sympathetic—or less culpable—to jurors, this approach could 
shift.197 During an interview, one prosecutor indicated that these decisions 
regarding the judgment of hypothetical jurors were “defendant-specific.”198 
And individual prosecutors could have different impressions of the relevance 
of these subjective assessments to plea discussions.199 
In other cases, prosecutors’ approaches to plea agreement discussions 
focused on locally and regionally specific attitudes of their anticipated lay 
decision-makers. A notable example of this was a case that involved an 
alleged assault of a child. The lead prosecutor assigned to the case took 
seriously the fact that prospective jurors in his region of the country would 
be likely to view a teacher’s use of physical discipline as problematic. Had 
the case been tried in another part of the country, he explained, their venire 
would have encompassed people with different approaches to punishing 
children.200 Because the lead prosecutor felt that the jurors summoned to 
court would characterize excessive physical discipline as abusive, he felt that 
he could approach plea agreement discussions with confidence.201 
Conceptions of a just plea agreement were thus informed by the trial team’s 
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consensus that they could prove the case before particular jurors they 
imagined, too. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Having established that federal prosecutors routinely invoke 
hypothetical jurors in their work, this Article now considers why this might 
be the case in light of the infrequency of trials. First, hypothetical jurors 
influence how prosecutors carry out their work in terms of trial preparation, 
collaboration, and navigating the norms of professional responsibility. 
Second, hypothetical jurors help inform understandings of justice. 
A. Effects of Prosecutors’ Consideration of Hypothetical Jurors 
Although the chances of particular cases proceeding to trial were low, 
federal prosecutors continued to use hypothetical jurors in their work. This 
research suggests that this imaginative exercise played three roles: 
prosecutors’ invocations of hypothetical jurors (1) had instrumental value in 
the event a case proceeded to trial, (2) contributed to prosecutors’ 
collaborative work, and (3) functioned as an ethical resource. 
1. Hypothetical Jurors Have Instrumental Value if Cases Proceed  
to Trial 
A first and obvious explanation for jurors’ salience in case preparation 
is lawyers’ instrumental interest in anticipating how jurors might respond to 
evidence and witnesses if there is any chance that a case would proceed to 
trial. To this end, a prosecutor explained that, despite having learned at a trial 
advocacy center that only four percent of cases went to trial, she wanted to 
be prepared.202 Anticipating the possibility that a case would be tried in court 
was thus analogized by some to preparing for an emergency.203 Prosecutors 
sought to make sure that from the moment a defendant was indicted, a case 
could weather the contingencies attendant to trial. This is because change 
during trial preparation was continual. A prosecutor explained in this vein 
that at a moment’s notice a case involving a cooperating witness could be 
 
 202 See, e.g., Interview with AO, AUSA (2013). Echoing this sentiment, numerous colleagues 
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turned on its head if that witness was unexpectedly arrested on the eve of 
trial.204 
In the process of defending the United States in a civil suit, another 
AUSA made a point of referring to a record of communications between an 
air traffic controller and pilot as a “partial transcript” rather than a transcript. 
If the case went to trial, he reasoned, this distinction would emphasize the 
incompleteness of the interactions that jurors would learn about in court. The 
plaintiff, in contrast, referred to an edited version of the transcript that made 
it appear as though the airplane at issue was the sole focus of the employee’s 
attention rather than one of eight planes for which he was responsible.205 
Numerous AUSAs in both the office’s civil and criminal divisions 
agreed that among the reasons to think about juries early in a case was the 
possibility that the weakest target of an investigation would exercise his or 
her right to a jury trial.206 In this vein, one prosecutor recalled losing a case 
because a “small fish” in a group of many targets chose not to plead guilty.207 
In other instances, prosecutors were assigned to cases long after defendants 
were indicted and cooperators chosen (and interviewed) by colleagues at 
other federal agencies. In one such case, a prosecutor regretted that 
instrumental calculations about how to present evidence to jurors often 
intervened late in his preparation. He explained his need to pitch the case to 
a jury to avoid the impression that the government was “ganging up” on a 
little guy.208 
Empirical studies of legal actors’ attitudes toward jurors have tended to 
focus on the strategic dimensions of lawyers’ thought processes.209 In the 
context of prosecutorial strategy, this orientation is not an altogether 
surprising one because the conflation of chronology and causality can be 
built into criminal law itself.210 Rather than focus only on legal outcomes, 
however, anthropologists of law are increasingly attentive to aspects of legal 
practice that transcend instrumental considerations.211 In the context 
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examined here, it is clear that prosecutors’ inordinate attention to jurors is 
not entirely attributable to ends-focused concerns such as (in the criminal 
context, for instance) obtaining convictions. As we have seen, prosecutors 
integrated talk of jurors into routine discussions—with one another and with 
me—as they assessed and debated particular decisions. 
2. Hypothetical Jurors Enhance the Democratic Character of 
Prosecutorial Decision-Making 
Hypothetical jurors also critically intervened in the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office to facilitate more egalitarian and collaborative discussions with trial 
partners, supervisors, and colleagues from other federal law enforcement 
agencies. Rather than explicitly critique colleagues’ opinions, lawyers 
frequently invoked the contrary perspectives of hypothetical jurors. Divisive 
suggestions, in other words, were imputed to future lay decision-makers. 
Invocations of imagined juror reactions thus served as legal fictions that 
afforded prosecutors flexibility to reframe peers’ approaches to cases in light 
of their various potential interpretations by outsiders.212 
Prosecutors’ ability to invoke jurors during preparation meetings, of 
course, depended on the occurrence of such meetings in the first place. The 
office’s particular organizational structure thus influenced the potential and 
quality of interactions between line attorneys and their supervisors. This 
included the office’s division into units with multiple levels of oversight—
including unit heads, chiefs and deputy chiefs, lawyers who worked directly 
with the U.S. Attorney and, in some cases, attorneys in the appeals unit who 
were assigned to work with trial teams. In the office that was the focus of 
this study, prosecutors often raised concerns about future jurors’ views 
during preliminary meetings and conversations with law enforcement agents. 
These discussions, as described herein, focused on the intelligibility of 
evidence and perceived credibility and character of witnesses, defendants, 
and victims. 
In these contexts, AUSAs grounded the contrary opinions they shared 
with supervisors and peers in the imagined perspectives of lay onlookers. 
This technique allowed conflicting views to be presented in impersonal terms 
while keeping lay intuitions about justice at the center of case discussions. 
The diversely constituted and unpredictable interpretations of future jurors 
thus raised the stakes of disregarding colleagues’ divergent views even when 
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they were not shared.213 In an office setting subject to continual personnel 
rearrangement facilitated by the presidential appointment of new U.S. 
Attorneys, such a technique of neutralizing hierarchical distinctions was 
essential. 
Though they offered a resource for prosecutors in conversation, 
concerns about hypothetical jurors’ perspectives did not necessarily win the 
day. In some cases, prosecutors’ assessments of the jury appeal of their cases 
failed to persuade supervisors to change their minds. One prosecutor, for 
example, recalled being approached by an agent with a fraudulent billing 
case involving a physician and her son. The prosecutor’s inclination at the 
time was to look for evidence of a larger scheme. When the agent brought 
her the case, she recalled, her instinct was to collect evidence that larger 
amounts of money had moved in and out of the clinic. If the doctor chose not 
to plead guilty, she would face the scrutiny of a similarly skeptical federal 
jury.214 After the defendant was sentenced to probation, the judge criticized 
the case, noting that neither defendant had a criminal record. The AUSA felt 
vindicated that the judge’s instincts about the case mirrored those she had 
imputed to potential jurors— despite a supervisor’s previous dismissal of her 
concerns. In subsequent cases, the prosecutor said this experience taught her 
to insist that supervisors take her commonsense critiques of cases more 
seriously.215 
3. Hypothetical Jurors Are an Ethical Resource for Prosecutors 
In Berger v. United States, Justice George Sutherland famously 
described the prosecutor’s role as seeing that “justice shall be done.”216 Legal 
scholars and practitioners have since puzzled over the meaning of justice in 
this context, noting its ambiguity.217 In practice, however, prosecutors 
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continually formulated understandings of what justice entailed in particular 
cases. And they did so with reference to hypothetical jurors’ perspectives, 
which served as a proxy for commonsense views that might not otherwise 
find explicit expression in their work. 
Imagined jurors were conducive to this exercise for several reasons. 
First, multiple and shifting identities and opinions could be imputed to them. 
That is, the varied and unpredictable responses of the laypeople prosecutors 
imagined authorized them to bring diversely constituted lay expertise into 
their case preparation.218 Second, hypothetical jurors’ embodiment of 
distinct personas and perspectives, and their broad evaluative potential, gave 
them moral malleability for attorneys who invoked them. Depending on the 
particular perspective a prosecutor sought to advance, distinct juror 
characteristics and intuitions could be selectively emphasized. 
Hypothetical jurors thus offered prosecutors a resource with which to 
consider disparate meanings of justice in the context of different cases. 
Though the prosecutors who were the subjects of this study viewed their 
central professional obligation as seeking justice, lawyers articulated 
subjective intuitions about the fairness of their cases that varied from one 
case and colleague to the next. To this end, invocations of hypothetical 
jurors’ perspectives, and formulations of jury appeal in particular, often 
brought the subject of justice into case assessments explicitly. One 
prosecutor noted, for example, that inquiries into jury appeal were aimed at 
determining whether cases were “fundamentally fair.”219 In this prosecutor’s 
view, fairness took shape with reference to hypothetical jurors who he 
imagined would differentiate between behavior that warranted prosecution 
and that which did not.220 
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Another prosecutor drew a connection between the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of his colleagues’ and jurors’ decision-making processes. 
Despite the fact that AUSAs shared professional training as lawyers and 
carried out similar work, he pointed out, it was entirely possible to get twelve 
different opinions on how to approach case preparation or characterize 
evidence in opening statements.221 Another colleague explained that 
everyone saw cases differently—often wrangling internally with doubt about 
what jurors would make of their judgment calls in particular cases.222 
Anticipating jurors’ reactions to evidence and witnesses, however, was an 
inherently speculative endeavor. The variability of jurors’ interpretations 
thus prompted prosecutors to take a reflexive and flexible approach to 
evaluating or cutting particular pieces of evidence from their cases.223 
An analog to prosecutors’ conceptual work can be found in studies of 
category creation in other social settings. Though his substantive and 
geographic foci differ, Professor Ira Bashkow’s research on the Orokaiva in 
Papua New Guinea revealed a similar technique of invoking hypothetical 
constructs of strangers to render judgment. For the Orokaiva, conceptions of 
foreigners were tied to ideas about abstracted qualities, activities, and objects 
understood as “detachable from persons.”224 Likewise, prosecutors 
conceived of justice with reference to characteristics they imputed to the 
places of affiliation, institutions, and occupations of imagined citizens. 
Though jurors—like foreigners for the Orokaiva—rarely appeared in person, 
they remained an abundant and generative foil for their creators, contributing 
to formulations of the identities of those who invoked them.225 
Two cases illustrated hypothetical jurors’ relevance as prosecutors 
negotiated their professional roles and competing visions of justice. The first 
involved the prosecution of a federally employed supervisor who allegedly 
violated the Whistleblower Protection Act by disabling a hotline which 
contained an anonymous report that criticized him. Noting jurors’ potential 
concerns, one prosecutor chose to frame the supervisor’s behavior as not 
only violating his obligations as an employee but also violating the freedom 
of those seeking to utilize a protected reporting process. Interjecting with the 
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contrary perspective of a detached observer, a colleague noted that the word 
“freedom” might sound out of place and urged the use of different language. 
Given popular attention to the perils of anonymous bullying, a juror might 
find the notion of “freely” reporting abuse less compelling than an argument 
for the protection of public welfare compromised by a supervisor’s alleged 
actions.226 
In a different case, a prosecutor critiqued a defendant for taking bribes 
in dive bars and coffee shops, where much of the surveillance evidence 
against him had been gathered. Here, again, a skeptical colleague intervened, 
highlighting the subliminally adverse impact that criticizing the defendant’s 
location could have on jurors. If white-collar criminals routinely planned 
criminal activity on golf courses without complaint, he argued, how would 
it look to criticize a defendant’s use of more modest and widely accessible 
locales? This colleague’s decision to frame his intervention in this meeting 
from a collective vantage point reflected an effort to present his views as 
encompassing those of listeners beyond his colleagues. In both cases, 
characterizations of cases were revised with an eye toward incorporating the 
concerns and intuitions of a plurality of imagined others. Though jurors were 
not privy to the interactions that purported to consider their perspectives, 
they nonetheless had an outsized influence on prosecutors’ work.227 
As these examples demonstrate, reference to hypothetical jurors 
enhanced the procedural justice of prosecutors’ collaborative work—
ensuring that each argument and counterargument was aired and considered 
on equal terms. This is not, of course, to suggest, that jurors functioned as an 
ethical constraint or that they necessarily facilitated just outcomes. To be 
sure, the idiosyncrasies of lawyers’ views, even projected onto jurors, could 
vary as widely as those of empaneled deliberating jurors. The next Section 
examines some of the justice considerations and concerns that accompany 
jurors’ inconsistent and uneven interventions as a narrative and strategic tool 
for legal practitioners. 
B. Hypothetical Jurors and Justice Considerations 
To the extent that common sense and local expertise are invoked to 
justify lay decision-makers’ participation in the U.S. legal system,228 the 
 
 226 See, e.g., Interview with AA, AUSA (2013). 
 227 Cf. DAVIS, supra note 74, at 5; SOUTHWORTH & FISK, supra note 87, at 336 (noting prosecutors’ 
relative lack of accountability due to their “amorphous” clients); McCoy, supra note 53, at 688. 
 228 For recent examples of this type of invocation, see Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion 
and Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861, 874–75 (2017). 
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influence of jurors exceeds their physical presence in courtrooms.229 
Acknowledgment of this empirical reality affirms the practical value of a 
robust jury system to lawyers’ work. Though hypothetical jurors are in no 
way equivalent to actual individuals summoned to court to participate in 
trials, their presence has a democratizing effect on prosecutors’ intraoffice 
decision-making processes. This is because they facilitate genuine 
engagement with alternative formulations of justice. When prosecutors 
imagine and give voice to so-called lay perspectives, they bring “ordinary 
moral and commonsense reasoning” into the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.230 Though prosecutors seldom have the opportunity to elicit 
feedback from jurors in person,231 they can nonetheless draw on the effects 
of such interactions as an ethical resource—including, as Professor Robert 
Burns has characterized it—by considering the “human dimension of legal 
questions that can be lost in piles of briefs and records.”232 
Prosecutors’ views, however, cannot—and ought not—be substituted 
for those of jurors. And there are certainly openings for prosecutors to 
effectively amend democratically passed laws by declining to prosecute their 
violation. Acknowledging this pernicious possibility, however, some 
prosecutors were quick to point out that even the presence of jurors during 
voir dire supplied them with limited or imperfect information, at best.233 In 
spite of their rarity, jurors nonetheless enlarged the range of arguments and 
considerations available during prosecutors’ deliberation, prompting them to 
revisit or challenge arguments and evidence that might otherwise go 
unquestioned. 
In the civil context, legal scholars have noted the extent to which 
knowledge of jury awards in past trials inform attorneys’ assessments of 
likely damage awards during settlement negotiations.234 John Guinther 
argues, for example, that 
juries have a function even when they aren’t functioning. That is, decisions are 
regularly made about the course a case will take based on the participants’ 
 
 229 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979) (inviting further empirical attention to how formal legal 
proceedings influence lawyers’ strategy and behavior). 
 230 BURNS, supra note 6, at 126. 
 231 Cf. Participation in a meeting with CZ during which a prosecutor said he learned jurors’ first-hand 
impressions from a post-trial meeting that was permitted in another jurisdiction where he worked as an 
Assistant District Attorney. See Interview with CZ, AUSA (2013). 
 232 BURNS, supra note 6, at 121. 
 233 See Offit, supra note 100, at 19; Offit, supra note 131, at 172 (noting that federal jury selection 
was a “‘low information’ process” due to judges’ wide discretion to limit the quantity and substance of 
the questions they posed to prospective jurors). 
 234 See, e.g., JONAKAIT, supra note 193, at 11. 
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beliefs of what would likely happen if the case were tried by a jury. It is probably 
no exaggeration to say that, directly or indirectly, the large majority of civil 
cases are settled without trial for this reason. Similarly, in criminal cases, 
defense lawyers particularly agonize over whether theirs is a “good” or “poor” 
jury case.235 
This effect may nonetheless be tempered by litigants who increasingly 
rely on past settlements as “precedent” for settlement decisions.236 Others 
point out that opportunities to informally and advantageously settle disputes 
may be limited by the absence of access to public adjudication.237 
As the examples discussed in this Article suggest, however, 
hypothetical jurors’ influence on case outcomes requires further empirical 
study. In assessing whether justice interests are served by the consideration 
of lay perspectives, several factors deserve emphasis. First, it is possible that 
the selective invocation of hypothetical jurors among different prosecutors 
and units resulted in unlike approaches to like cases. Exacerbating the 
potential for the inconsistent enforcement of federal law, prosecutors with 
less experience with jury trials could find lay decision-makers less relevant 
to their case preparation. In the declined case involving fake drug 
prescriptions, for example, a prosecutor in a different U.S. Attorney’s office 
might have chosen to prosecute the case due to the clear violation of federal 
law, availability of evidence, and preparedness of other law enforcement 
agents to move forward with the case. Likewise, lawyers could differ in their 
prosecutions of drug cases that involved “reverse” sting operations from one 
jurisdiction, narcotics unit, and part of the country to the next. 
Cases referred to as “home invasion reversals” presented a different 
ethical dilemma. To what extent could the selective prosecution of 
defendants who seemed superficially more threatening (or less sympathetic) 
lead to the disproportionate prosecution of those with criminal records? Or 
to the targeting of those already known to the law enforcement agents who 
investigated them? Legal scholars and practitioners in the United States have 
long advanced arguments about the potential for jury verdicts to be 
“unpredictable and arbitrary, susceptible to being moved by factors which 
 
 235 JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA, at xv (1988). 
 236 J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1727 (2012) 
(“Contrary to the conventional account of settlements, characterized as unknown and unknowable, 
empirical evidence reveals that prior settlement outcomes, which internalize the various distortions 
mentioned above, now serve as an increasingly important determinant of future settlements. As the 
shadow of the law is fading, a new shadow is emerging: the shadow of settlement.”). 
 237 See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving 
Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 46 (1984) (“[I]nformal community justice is 
unlikely to serve many disputants unless it is intimately connected to some formal legal agency.”). 
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do not have to do with the evidence.”238 Debates about jurors’ right to be 
informed about their power to disregard—or “nullify”—the law point to a 
similar source of ambivalence about discretionary judgment with limited 
oversight.239 Greater awareness of how consideration of jury appeal can 
effectively amend the enforcement of federal laws thus also demands further 
study. On one hand, such considerations have the potential to counter the 
overcriminalization of cases that fail to comport with commonsense ideas 
about justice. On the other, prosecutors can freely authorize their own 
idiosyncratic views by putting them in the mouths of hypothetical others. 
Because cases are ultimately settled by groups rather than individuals, 
collective deliberation (whether in a jury room or prosecutor’s office) 
emerges as a vital context for sharing, challenging, or reconciling discordant 
opinions. 
Alternative ethical frameworks for bringing extralegal considerations 
to criminal prosecutions warrant empirical attention, too. This includes the 
implications of preparing cases in the shadow of idiosyncratic federal judges 
or presidentially appointed U.S. Attorneys whose views may be well-known 
to AUSAs and yet be perceived as unjust in the context of particular cases. 
As a rhetorical device through which commonsense justice claims can be 
aired and contested, reference to hypothetical jurors may also stand as an 
alternative to other metrics for exercising discretion—including AUSAs’ 
perceptions, for example, of a defendant’s risk aversion or poor quality of 
legal representation. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO FACILITATE THE CONSIDERATION OF JURORS 
The reduced presence of juries has not entirely robbed them of their 
ideational effects, including their role as an ethical resource for prosecutors 
during case preparation. This is because prosecutors often impute lay 
conceptions of fairness and local knowledge to lay decision-makers in the 
course of routine case preparation. In some cases, this knowledge originated 
from encounters with jurors during voir dire, questionnaire responses, or 
colleagues’ impressions of jurors that were empaneled in past trials. In other 
cases, prosecutors attributed their own local knowledge to “proxy” jurors 
that included nonlawyer friends, family, and office staff. Though jurors did 
not participate in such discussions firsthand, this Article challenges the 
notion that prosecutors’ work is completely attenuated from consideration of 
 
 238 See, e.g., PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 218 (1984). 
 239 JOHN W. CLARK III, THE AMERICAN JURY: ISSUES AND COMMENTARY 157–58 (2010); NEIL 
VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 236–40 (2007). 
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outside, lay observers.240 Time and again this public takes the form of an 
imagined jury. 
Despite the inherent difficulty of applying findings from one case study 
to distinct office settings, this research highlights the potential of particular 
office practices to facilitate consideration of hypothetical jurors’ views. First, 
convening regular meetings with trial teams, supervisors, colleagues, and 
staff can simulate the range of responses jurors can bring to a case. In the 
context of this study, such meetings took the form of status updates with law 
enforcement agents who were assembling evidence and, later, focused on 
mooting trial teams’ opening statements and summations. 
Second, to the extent that prosecutions do result in jury trials, U.S. 
Attorney’s Office leadership should regularly circulate trial calendars and 
encourage AUSAs to observe portions of colleagues’ trials as a precondition 
for trying their own cases. At the conclusion of trials, attorneys who served 
on or assisted trial teams should be encouraged to discuss their experience in 
the form of internal Continuing Legal Education programming that assumes 
a conversational format. Prosecutors should also be encouraged to devote 
time early in their case preparation to drafting—or locating— plain-language 
jury instructions, case-specific voir dire questions, questionnaires, and case 
statements. These practices further reinforce the practice of putting potential 
jurors’ perspectives front and center in AUSAs’ routine work. 
Prosecutors’ integration of lay perspectives into case discussions also 
has the distinct and underappreciated benefit of making their own decision-
making practices more democratic. As this research reveals, the potential 
presence of jurors underscored the importance of considering multiple 
perspectives by eliciting colleagues’ divergent opinions. Furthermore, 
jurors’ views were invoked as part of a constructive and nonconfrontational 
technique of shaping colleagues’ behavior. Jurors thus contributed an ethical 
dimension to prosecutors’ talk by offering a vantage point that was distinct 
from the lawyers and supervisors involved in particular cases which allowed 
for external standards of judgment and critique. As part of this practice, trial 
teams verbalized impressions of evidence and witnesses with reference to 
jurors’ third-person perspectives. 
Beyond the contributions of hypothetical jurors discussed in this 
Article, social scientists have highlighted a number of the jury system’s 
virtues. These include evidence that jury service in criminal cases facilitates 
broader civic engagement, including a willingness to participate as voters in 
 
 240 See SOUTHWORTH & FISK, supra note 87, at 336 (“The absence of a traditional client enables 
prosecutors to take a broad view of what justice requires in a particular case, but it also means that no one 
outside the bureaucracy of the federal or state Department of Justice or law enforcement community 
effectively constrains how prosecutors exercise their power.”). 
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electoral politics.241 Another study found, with some qualification, that 
citizens who deliberate as part of twelve-person, unanimous civil trials are 
more likely to vote after their service.242 Focusing on civil trials in particular, 
empirical studies have drawn attention to the favorable impressions of the 
fairness of the legal system generated by jury participation.243 Others argue 
that the jury has a legitimating function as a democratic institution that 
allows ordinary people to render legal judgment,244 contribute to a fact-
finding body,245 and reap the benefits of an educational resource.246 
Prosecutors nonetheless face barriers to empaneling a diverse group of 
prospective jurors. Though research suggests that most attrition from jury 
service occurs during the preliminary “summoning” and “summons 
response” phases,247 the greatest source of juror attrition observed in this 
study related to the hardship a trial might pose to a prospective juror. This 
finding is corroborated by jury participation research carried out in 
 
 241 See JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES 
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 32 (2010) (describing the authors’ approach to 
testing whether jury participation led to greater civil engagement in a Thurston County, Washington case 
study); John Gastil et al., Jury Service and Electoral Participation: A Test of the Participation Hypothesis, 
70 J POL. 351, 359 (2008) (noting evidence of a “pervasive and enduring effect of criminal jury 
deliberation on electoral engagement”). 
 242 Traci Feller, John Gastil & Valerie Hans, The Civic Impact of Civil Jury Service, VOIR DIRE, 
Summer 2016, at 24, 26 (noting that this result was particularly true of non-automotive tort cases that 
involve “at least one organization, as opposed to exclusively private individuals”); see also Valerie P. 
Hans, John Gastil & Traci Feller, Deliberative Democracy and the American Civil Jury, 11 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 697, 712–15 (2014) (providing an additional discussion of how findings are extended to 
the civil context). 
 243 Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve 
as Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 282, 285 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
 244 VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 248 (1986) (citing ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE & JOHN CANFIELD SPENCER, AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE (1854)); 
see also ALBERT W. DZUR, DEMOCRATIC PROFESSIONALISM: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, IDENTITY, AND PRACTICE 111 (2008) (“Far from merely 
constraining the power of the judge, the jury system legitimates the power of the judge.”). For a discussion 
of the seventeenth-century origin of this principle, see SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 31 (1990) 
(“The argument that the common individual is capable of knowing and understanding the law, and having 
understood is the best judge of its application to individual cases, is an inherently democratic claim of 
epistemology.”).  
 245 See, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 
387–90 (1954). 
 246 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 334–37 (Schoken ed., 1st ed. 1961) (1835)). 
 247 As Professor Mary Rose and her co-authors outline in their study of lifetime jury participation in 
Texas, jurors must be summoned for jury service, recognize and respond to this summons, and complete 
a period of in-court questioning in order to be assigned to sit as jurors in particular cases. See Mary R. 
Rose et al., Selected to Serve: An Analysis of Lifetime Jury Participation, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
33, 35 (2012). 
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California, noting that citizens’ likelihood of being summoned and 
responding to summonses is strongly influenced by their income and 
education.248 These findings have led researchers and those involved in jury 
reform initiatives to address practical and material obstacles to jury 
participation, including compensation that can alleviate financial hardship 
imposed by jury service249 and the expansion of jury source lists, which often 
rely on voter registration and licensed driver records.250 A significant 
contribution of these studies is the part they play in unsettling the 
misconception that citizens routinely ignore summonses due to their 
indifference or hostility toward jury service.251 In fact it has long been known 
that the individuals who are least likely to participate as jurors are those who 
face economic barriers including the need to care for a child or other 
dependent, or the risk of loss of income.252 Though it is beyond the scope of 
this Article to propose jury reforms addressing this systemic problem, 
ongoing empirical research is shedding light on obstacles that prevent 
prosecutors from encountering juries as diversely and unpredictably 
constituted as those they imagine. 
 
 248 See id. at 45–52; see also HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 64–65 (1993) (noting that factors that are likely to 
lead to prospective jurors’ excusal include “(1) economic hardship; (2) lack of child care; (3) age; (4) the 
distance traveled and transportation; and (5) illness”). 
 249 See GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, THE STATE-OF-THE-
STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 13 (2007) (“[S]tates have 
begun to recognize the relationship between the amount of juror fees, the proportion of citizens who are 
excused for financial hardship, and minority representation in the jury pool. As a result, a number of states 
have increased juror fees . . . .”); Paula Hannaford-Agor, The Laborer is Worthy of His Hire and Jurors 
Are Worthy of Their Juror Fees, 21 COURT MANAGER 38, 38 (2006) (noting that states are substantially 
increasing juror fees in order to alleviate the financial hardship of jury service, making it possible for 
many citizens to serve, and to better reflect in monetary terms the value of jury service to the justice 
system).  
 250 G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, JURY SYSTEM MANAGEMENT 4 (1996). 
 251 See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 85, at 248 (“Among those who do appear and are sent into a 
courtroom for voir dire, the art of getting excused is highly developed. Individuals accuse themselves of 
prejudice, students say they cannot afford to miss classes, and self-employed persons state they cannot 
afford to miss work.”); ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, IMPROVING CITIZEN RESPONSE TO JURY SUMMONSES: 
A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 117–20 (1998) (presenting a multi-sited study including surveys of 
administrators in 100 state and federal courts and 400 summoned jurors); GUINTHER, supra note 235, at 
288–89, 353–54 (noting, based on a survey of 352 individuals who served as state and federal jurors in 
civil cases in the Philadelphia area, that a majority understood their cases, formed opinions based on the 
evidence in their respective trials, and left with a positive impression of the jury system). 
 252 See BOATRIGHT, supra note 251, at 73; see also JANICE T. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, THE RELATIONSHIP OF JUROR FEES AND TERMS OF SERVICE TO JURY SYSTEM 
PERFORMANCE 40 (1991), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/juries/id/105 
[https://perma.cc/WY9P-FM9P]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1118 
CONCLUSION 
In writing on the Sixth Amendment, legal scholars have emphasized the 
jury’s role in helping lawyers “fulfill their duties responsibly.”253 This 
widely acknowledged ethical intervention becomes concrete when one looks 
at how lawyers invoke jurors in practice. Though absent from empirical 
research to date, federal prosecutors’ references to abstracted jurors play a 
vital role in their everyday work. This research demonstrates that 
prosecutors’ conceptions of jurors’ judgment affects their own.254 This is 
because the specter of jurors’ participation in criminal cases brought 
commonsense ideas about justice to prosecutors’ discussions—making jury 
concerns salient from the moment a case landed on an AUSA’s desk.255 
Such attentiveness to jurors’ potential perceptions is brought into relief 
first by prosecutors’ invocations of “jury appeal” as a basis for articulating 
concerns about their cases. Second, as investigations are underway, 
hypothetical jurors can offer a detached point of reference during routine 
interactions with colleagues, witnesses, victims, and defendants. Because 
any criminal case can lead to a trial, many prosecutors recognize the strategic 
value of considering jurors’ perspectives early and often. And when 
assessments of evidence are at odds with those of supervisors, hypothetical 
jurors facilitate critiques in impersonal and constructive terms. Beyond 
instrumental considerations related to efficaciously presenting evidence in a 
case, hypothetical jurors are also a point of departure for prosecutors’ 
formulations of justice. This often takes the form of prosecutors imputing 
ideas about fair prosecutions to lay decision-makers whom they imagine they 
might encounter. 
Legal scholars who draw attention to the declining number of trials in 
the United States often assert the value of lay participation in symbolic terms. 
If the trend away from juries can be reversed, some argue, a reinvigorated 
jury can bring greater legitimacy and accountability to the legal system by 
serving as an external check on professional lawyers.256 Ethnographic 
research in prosecutors’ offices is uniquely positioned to sharpen the stakes 
of this claim. The jury system ought to be valued for its far-reaching practical 
and ethical effects on legal practice, even as it is presently constituted. That 
 
 253 Sixth Amendment at Trial, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 671, 671–72 (2012). 
 254 Andrew E. Taslitz, The People’s Peremptory Challenge and Batson: Aiding the People’s Voice 
and Vision Through the “Representative” Jury, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1675, 1678 (2012) (“The jury acts as 
the People’s eyes by monitoring the state and its agents. That monitoring reveals abuses of power, 
discourages those abuses, and humbles our leaders and their agents.”). 
 255 See, e.g., Interview with DH, AUSA (2013). 
 256 See, e.g., ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY MATTERS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION 139–42 (2013) (discussing the jury’s role in acting as a force for accountability 
which serves as the community’s consciousness and as an ultimate check on government power). 
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is, we should care about jurors because they concretely and powerfully 
matter to the lawyers tasked with enforcing the law fairly. Though the 
obsolescence of the jury trial is difficult to imagine, keeping jurors 
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